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  2Abstract 
 
Special Publication 800-57 provides cryptographic key management guidance. It consists 
of three parts. Part 1 provides general guidance and best practices for the management of 
cryptographic keying material. Part 2 provides guidance on policy and security planning 
requirements for U.S. government agencies. Finally, Part 3 provides guidance when using 
the cryptographic features of current systems.  
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backup; certification; compromise; confidentiality; cryptanalysis; cryptographic key; 
cryptographic module; digital signature; key management; key management policy; key 
recovery; private key; public key; public key infrastructure; security plan; trust anchor; 
validation.  
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  4Authority 
 
This document has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Public Law 107-347.  
NIST is responsible for developing standards and guidelines, including minimum 
requirements, for providing adequate information security for all agency operations and 
assets, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems. 
This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 8b(3), Securing Agency Information Systems, as 
analyzed in A-130, Appendix IV: Analysis of Key Sections. Supplemental information is 
provided in A-130, Appendix III.  
This guideline has been prepared for use by Federal agencies. It may be used by 
nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright. 
(Attribution would be appreciated by NIST.)  
Nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines made 
mandatory and binding on Federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under 
statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding 
the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other 
Federal official.  
Conformance testing for implementations of key management as specified in this 
Recommendation will be conducted within the framework of the Cryptographic Module 
Validation Program (CMVP), a joint effort of NIST and the Communications Security 
Establishment of the Government of Canada. Cryptographic implementations must 
adhere to the requirements in this Recommendation in order to be validated under the 
CMVP. The requirements of this Recommendation are indicated by the word “shall.”  
  5Overview 
 
“Application-Specific Key Management Guidance”, Part 3 of the Recommendation for 
Key Management is intended primarily to help system administrators and system 
installers adequately secure applications based on product availability and organizational 
needs and to support organizational decisions about future procurements.  The guide also 
provides information for end users regarding application options left under their control 
in normal use of the application.  Recommendations are given for a select set of 
applications, namely: 
 
Section 2 - Public Key Infrastructures (PKI)  
Section 3 - Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 
Section 4 – Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
Section 5 - Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) 
Section 6 – Kerberos 
Section 7 - Over-the-Air Rekeying of Digital Radios (OTAR) 
Section 8 - Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) 
Section 9 – Encrypted File Systems (EFS) 
 
The following is provided for each topic: 
 
•  A brief description of the system under discussion that is intended to provide 
context for the security guidance, 
•  Recommended algorithm suites and key sizes and associated security and 
compliance issues, 
•  Recommendations concerning the use of the mechanism in its current form for the 
protection of Federal government information,   
•  Security considerations that may affect the security effectiveness of key 
management processes, 
•  General recommendations for purchase decision makers, system installers, system 
administrators and end users. 
 
Following Section 9 are four appendices with a glossary, an explanation of acronyms, a 
word to novice end users with basic information on obtaining and using keys and finally 
references for documents cited herein. 
 
This document does not reflect a comprehensive view of current products and technical 
specifications.  Future versions of this document will include updates to the topics 
covered, additional subjects such as Secure Shell (SSH), IEEE 802.1x Port Based 
Network Access Control, Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) and other focus areas 
as new techniques are widely implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
  6NIST Commercial Disclaimer 
 
Certain commercial equipment, instruments, or materials (or suppliers, or software,…) 
are identified in this paper to foster understanding. Such identification does not imply 
recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
nor does it imply that the materials or equipment identified are necessarily the best 
available for the purpose. 
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1   Introduction  
1.1  Purpose 
Part 3 of the Recommendation for Key Management, Application-Specific Key 
Management Guidance, is intended to address the key management issues associated 
with currently available cryptographic mechanisms.  General Guidance, Part 1 of the 
Recommendation for Key Management, contains basic key management guidance for 
users, developers and system managers regarding the "best practices" associated with the 
generation and use of the various classes of cryptographic keying material. General 
Organization and Management Requirements, Part 2 of the Recommendation, provides a 
framework and general guidance to support establishing cryptographic key management 
within an organization, and a basis for satisfying the key management aspects of statutory 
and policy-based security planning requirements for Federal government organizations.  
 
This document, Part 3 of the Recommendation, is designed for system installers, system 
administrators and end users of existing key management infrastructures, protocols, and 
other applications, as well as the people making purchasing decisions
1 for new systems 
using currently available technology. Note that end users who act as their own system 
installers,  administrators and purchasing agents may find the guidance intended for 
administrators, installers and purchasers to be beneficial.  In centrally managed 
organizations, the organization’s management must establish a security policy that acts as 
a foundation for all end user guidance. 
 
Recommendations are made for mechanisms designed to protect stored data and data in 
transit.  This document will not provide a complete restatement of existing standards or 
implementation directives.  Standards and guidelines with this level of detail are 
referenced where appropriate.   
  
For each of the key management infrastructures, protocols, and applications addressed in 
Part 3, the following is provided: 
 
•  A brief description of the system under discussion that is intended to provide 
context for the security guidance, 
•  Recommended algorithm suites and key sizes and associated security and 
compliance issues, 
•  Recommendations concerning the use of the mechanism in its current form for the 
protection of Federal government information,   
•  Security considerations that may affect the security effectiveness of key 
management processes, 
                                                 
1 This is not necessarily a procurement officer but likely a person making the decision on the IT product to 
be used. 
  11•  General recommendations for purchase decision makers, system installers, system 
administrators and end users. 
 
The logistics of how one should obtain, store or transfer keys or key pairs within a given 
application or system are application and implementation-specific and beyond the scope 
of this document.  In large Federal systems, these functions are frequently handled by 
system administrators or completed with direct guidance from system administrators.  For 
end users faced with these tasks on their own, an informative appendix has been included 
with general information intended to point the end user in the right direction. 
 
Since some of the infrastructures, protocols and applications addressed in this 
Recommendation will be refined or replaced over the next few years, the guidance 
provided herein will become obsolete. Similarly, it is anticipated that new infrastructures, 
protocols, and applications will be developed. Although this document will be updated as 
mechanisms and techniques evolve, it may not always reflect a comprehensive view of 
current products and technical specifications.  Hence, references to version numbers or 
other implementation status information are provided to enable an evaluation of the 
applicability of particular elements of guidance to the specific version of an 
infrastructure, protocol, or application into which a mechanism is integrated. 
 
Note that many of the applications described in Part 3 are currently in use by U.S. 
government agencies. Some of these applications were developed and implemented prior 
to the release of Part 1 of this Recommendation, and therefore, may not follow all of the 
principles identified in Part 1. The use of current implementations of these applications 
may be necessary until more carefully designed applications are available.  It is very 
important that each implementation that does not comply with NIST standards and 
guidelines be evaluated for associated risks and that steps be taken to mitigate those risks 
as discussed in this Recommendation.   
 
1.2  Requirement Terms 
This Recommendation often uses “requirement” terms; these terms have the following 
meaning in this document: 
1.  shall: This term is used to indicate a requirement of a Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS) or a requirement that must be fulfilled to claim 
conformance to this Recommendation. Note that shall may be coupled with not to 
become shall not. 
2.  should: This term is used to indicate an important recommendation.  Ignoring the 
recommendation could result in undesirable results.  Ignoring recommendations to 
accommodate the acceptance of messages protected with commonly used, 
unapproved ciphers may create interoperability issues.  Ignoring 
recommendations to select new products with approved, seldom used 
cryptographic mechanisms may leave an organization ill-prepared to migrate 
away from mechanisms that will soon be inappropriate for the protection of 
Federal systems.  Note that should may be coupled with not to become should 
not. 
 
  121.3  General Protocol Considerations 
There are a number of general issues associated with the protocols discussed in Part 3.  
Four of these issues are briefly discussed in order to familiarize the reader with concepts 
that will be repeated throughout the document and to help frame the upcoming 
discussions:   
•  Mandatory-to-implement vs. optional-to-implement, 
•  Cryptographic negotiation, 
•  Single or multi-use keys, and 
•  Algorithm and key size transitions. 
 
1.3.1  Mandatory-to-Implement versus Optional-to-Implement 
Many of the cryptographic security services described in this document are based on 
public standards (e.g., IETF RFCs, American National Standards, etc.).  In these 
standards, algorithms are frequently described as mandatory-to-implement or optional-to-
implement. Neither of these terms provides information about the security of the 
algorithm. 
 
Mandatory-to-implement algorithms will be in any product that meets the public 
standards, allowing interoperability between products.   
 
Optional-to-implement algorithms tend to be next-generation algorithms that may 
become mandatory-to-implement algorithms in a future version of the standard.  There 
could be considerable delay in the widespread use of these new algorithms for a variety 
of reasons, ranging from a need for supporting hardware or software upgrades, to issues 
of interoperability.  For example, an algorithm that is optional-to-implement within an 
S/MIME protocol may not currently be supported by the system’s cryptographic module. 
However, these algorithms often offer improved security that could significantly increase 
the longevity of the system.  Therefore, one may want to consider buying products that 
support the optional-to-implement algorithms, even if those algorithms will not be 
available to all end users immediately.   
 
As previously defined, the terms shall and should are used to provide information about 
whether algorithms have adequate security for use on Federal computer networks.  As 
such, there may be mandatory-to-implement algorithms (e.g., Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) or RC2) that do not provide adequate security, and this document will say they 
shall not be used.  Similarly, there may be optional-to-implement algorithms that have 
greater security (e.g., AES) and which this document may say should or shall be used in 
a given situation. 
 
The distinction between mandatory-to-implement and optional-to-implement is important 
when two users on different systems desire to communicate or when different levels of 
security may be required for different applications running on the same system.  This is 
further discussed in the next section on cryptographic negotiation. 
 
 
  131.3.2   Cryptographic  Negotiation 
Parts 1 and 2 of this Recommendation establish a sound basis for selecting appropriate 
cryptographic algorithms and managing the corresponding cryptographic keys. However, 
enforcing these guidelines can be problematic for a number of reasons, including the 
unavailability of certain algorithms or key sizes, the preferences of the parties in 
communication or other system limitations.  When servers dictate the algorithms used, 
the server may select the algorithms that optimize overall system performance rather than 
the algorithms that provide the highest level of security.   
 
In some multi-party protocols where multiple algorithms are supported for the same 
purpose, a client can enforce the rules in Parts 1 and 2 through negotiation within the 
protocol. Some protocols (e.g., S/MIME) allow the initiating client to select the 
cryptographic algorithms without negotiating with the receiving client.  In this case, as in 
the case where applications do not permit negotiation, a receiving client may be presented 
with information that has been inadequately protected. For example, a receiving client 
may receive a signed and encrypted S/MIME email message that was encrypted using 
DES and signed with a 512-bit RSA key
2. Rejecting such messages does not necessarily 
enhance security (in this case, the message has already been sent over the Internet), but 
the receiving user should be aware that the security services purportedly provided by the 
digital signature and content encryption are suspect and cannot be depended upon. It may 
be appropriate to reject the message or terminate the protocol. A risk assessment and 
subsequent organizational policy may be required to determine the appropriate course of 
action. 
 
In other protocols (e.g., TLS), the client proposes a set of options, and the server chooses 
from the proposed list during a negotiation phase of the protocol. Where negotiation is 
supported, protocols may be designed to negotiate cipher suites or to negotiate each 
algorithm independently. In either case, a client or server may be faced with a situation 
where the preferred algorithms of the client or server and the proposed algorithms of the 
other party are not of the same security strength, or where approved algorithms are not 
available. 
 
Another issue may arise when a protocol is designed to negotiate algorithms, but not key 
sizes. In such a case, the clients may find themselves communicating with approved 
algorithms, but inadequate key sizes. For example, after negotiating for RSA signatures, 
the client might get a message signed with a 512-bit RSA key
3. 
 
Enforcing the recommendations from Parts 1 and 2 may also be complicated by system or 
application design decisions. Systems may have application-specific controls for 
cryptographic algorithms, or they may have system-wide controls. For example, a user 
may wish to restrict one application to using AES, and another to using TDEA, while the 
system design may only allow the use of TDEA. Often the only limitation on public key 
sizes is an indirect limitation through the choice of root CA keys.  (See Section 2.1).   
 
                                                 
2 The DES algorithm and the 512-bit RSA key size do not provide adequate security (see Part 1).  
3 A 512-bit RSA key does not provide an acceptable security strength (see Part 1). 
  14When there are a variety of algorithms or key sizes available for a given communication 
protocol, the following questions need to be addressed: 
•  Is negotiation mandatory, optional or unsupported?   
•  When negotiation is supported, who proposes the cryptographic mechanisms to be 
used, who selects the mechanisms, and what are the selection criteria?  
•  Is negotiation based on predefined cipher suites, or is each algorithm proposed 
independently?  
•  What is the granularity for the negotiation: just algorithms, both algorithms and 
key sizes, combinations of algorithms and/or key sizes, or protocol versions? 
•   What cannot be specified? 
A good start at ensuring communication security in a multi-algorithm setting would be to: 
•  Limit the list of algorithms available to the application to those best suited for 
users of the system and those needed for interoperability, 
•  Adopt a policy that disallows sending messages using an inadequate level of 
protection,  
•  Adopt a policy explaining how to respond to messages received without adequate 
protection, and  
•  Adopt a policy explaining what to do when faced with a need for secure 
communications with a party using un-approved algorithms or inadequate key 
sizes. 
 
1.3.3  Single or Multi-Use Keys 
A major thrust from Part 1 of this Recommendation is that, in general, keys should not 
be used for multiple cryptographic purposes.  For example, in most cases, the same keys 
should not be used to generate a digital signature and to establish other keying material 
(see Part 1, Section 8.1.5.1.1.2 for the rare exceptions to this guidance).  It is less clear as 
to whether a digital signature key, for example, can be used only for a specific 
application (e.g., signing e-mail) or for multiple applications (e.g., for both signing e-mail 
and signing documents).  In some cases, it may be acceptable for an application to share 
keys with other applications. In other cases, sharing keys may not be desirable. For 
example, best practices indicate that a server’s TLS keys should not be used to support 
other applications. Even where keys are used to perform the same cryptographic 
operation (e.g., digital signatures), sharing keys may be inappropriate because one 
application could be providing one service (e.g., authentication), while a second 
application could be providing a different service (e.g., non-repudiation). It is important 
to remember that it may be a bad idea to use keys for multiple applications. 
 
An agency should perform a risk assessment when considering the use of the same key 
for multiple applications. 
 
  151.3.4  Algorithm and Key Size Transition 
Part 1 of this Recommendation provides timeframes for transitioning from algorithms 
and key sizes currently in use by many applications and protocols in order to increase the 
strength of the security mechanisms in the future. In many cases, the algorithms and key 
sizes required to provide adequate security are not available within the current 
implementations or are unavailable uniformly across the community of users that need to 
interoperate. Transitions to new algorithms or key sizes will not necessarily occur 
instantaneously, but will require gradual upgrades across a system. For example, a system 
owner may have the need to upgrade his system’s email package before upgrading the 
cryptographic module.  Hence, for a period of time, the system may be running with an 
email package capable of TDEA and AES 128 encryption, but a cryptographic module 
that can only handle TDEA.  There will be a need to upgrade components of a system 
with new capabilities, while continuing to support the old capabilities, until all 
components have been upgraded.  
During this transition period, interaction between components can proceed in one of the 
following ways: 
1.  Some means is provided to determine when the new security mechanism is 
available to all parties in a given transaction so that it can be used instead of the 
old security mechanism (e.g., using a protocol that negotiates the security 
mechanisms to be used). When the new security mechanism is not available to all 
parties involved in a transaction, the old security mechanism can be used. This 
approach has the advantage that when a set of parties have the newer mechanism, 
their transactions are protected at a higher security level. The disadvantage is that 
those transactions using the old security mechanism are not as well protected; this 
also raises the possibility that the same information could be sent in different 
transactions between two or more sets of parties using security mechanisms of 
different strengths – in effect, nullifying the higher security strength provided by 
the new security mechanism
4.   
2.  All components use the old security mechanism until all components have been 
updated; at that time, the system immediately transitions to the new capability. 
This approach has the potential problem that all components would not be 
updated by the deadline, thus providing inadequate protections for all information 
during the period following the deadline until such time as all components have 
been upgraded. However, this approach has the advantage that the same data will 
not be sent at two different security levels.
5 
Most of the applications and protocols discussed in Part 3 require an upgrade of the 
available security mechanisms to be compliant with Part 1. The following sections 
provide guidance on how the existing mechanisms may best be used until appropriate 
upgrades can be made. Organizations and system administrators must determine the 
approach for transitioning to stronger security mechanisms within a system.  
                                                 
4 This becomes an issue when higher security level users are unaware that others may be using a lower 
security level mechanism to protect the same information. 
5 Assuming that data sent before the transition is not also sent after the transition. 
  162  Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)  
2.1  Description 
A PKI is the most common key management approach for the distribution of public keys. 
As described in SP 800-57, Part 1, public keys are used to establish security services after 
obtaining a variety of assurances: assurance of integrity, assurance of domain parameter 
validity, assurance of public key validity, and assurance of private key possession.  In 
most cases, applications must also establish the identity of the user associated with this 
key pair.   In a PKI, the infrastructure establishes the user’s identity and the required 
assurances to provide a strong foundation for security services in PKI-enabled 
applications and protocols, including IPsec (Section 3), Transport Layer Security (Section 
4), S/MIME secure mail (Section 5) and some versions of Kerberos (Section 6).  This 
section presents basic guidance for PKI-based key management.  For broader and more 
detailed information on PKI, see SP 800-32 [SP 800-32]. 
 
Public key certificates bind two names to a public key, the user’s name and the issuer’s 
name, using a digital signature generated by the issuer. The user is the party authorized to 
use the private key associated with the public key in the certificate. The issuer is a trusted 
third party that generates and signs the certificate after verifying: the identity of the user; 
the validity of the public key, associated algorithms and any relevant parameters; and the 
user’s possession of the corresponding private key. The issuer is known as a Certificate 
Authority (CA).  In many cases, the CA will delegate responsibility for the verification of 
the subject’s identity to a Registration Authority (RA).  The certificate is used to 
distribute the user’s public key to other interested parties, known as relying parties, since 
they rely on the assurances provided by the PKI and the certificate creation process. 
 
CAs generally issue a self-signed certificate called a root certificate (sometimes also 
called a trust anchor); this is used by applications and protocols to validate the 
certificates issued by a CA. CA certificates play a key role in many protocols and 
applications, and are generally kept in what is often called a root certificate store.   Much 
of the business of properly configuring applications and protocols consists of ensuring 
that only appropriate root certificates are loaded into the root certificate store.  In 
Microsoft Windows operating systems, there are root certificate stores that are 
maintained by the operating system for various purposes that are shared by various 
Microsoft protocols and applications, and by other applications that may choose to use 
them.  There is a similar “Keychain” facility in the Apple operating systems.   Some 
applications, intended to be portable between operating systems, maintain their own root 
certificate stores.
6   
 
Certificates are generally issued in accordance with a certificate policy.  Generally that 
policy can be found on the issuing CA’s website.  If an organization’s policy, for 
example, is to accept only certificates that use at least 2048-bit RSA, 2048-bit DSA or 
                                                 
6 The various Mozilla browsers and E-mail clients, and the Apache web servers are examples.  Microsoft 
Internet Explorer, Outlook and Internet Information Server all use the Windows root certificate store; 
Apple Safari and Mail use the Keychain; and Mozilla Firefox, Thunderbird and SeaMonkey all use root 
certificate stores associated specifically with the application. 
  17224-bit elliptic curve cryptography, and either SHA-1, SHA-224 or SHA-256, then the 
only practical way to ensure that public key sizes meet the requirements is usually to 
ensure that the root certificate store contains only root certificates with a certificate policy 
that requires these algorithms and key sizes in its subordinate certificates.  Current 
applications that use PKI will check to ensure that a certificate has been issued under the 
root certificate in the application’s root store, and that it has not been subsequently 
revoked, but will not otherwise check the suitability of the public key or hash algorithms 
used in the certificate – the application will simply use the specified keys to compute the 
mathematically correct results. So, correctly configuring root certificate stores is a critical 
step in key management. 
 
The specifics of where the root certificate store is located and how it is managed for each 
application and protocol are beyond the scope of this Recommendation.  Typically, 
however, there are menus for viewing and managing certificate stores in the browser 
applications, but this is subject to change with each product update.  There may also be 
utilities and features in the operating system or application for centralized management 
by the system administrator.  When a browser or other application encounters an 
unrecognized CA certificate, end users may be prompted to add that certificate to their 
permanent trusted certificate store, temporarily trust the certificate, or reject the 
certificate and close the application. 
 
The most common certificate format is the X.509 version 3 (X.509v3) certificate; see 
RFC 5280 [RFC 5280].  In addition to the user and issuer names and the public key, all 
X.509 certificates also include a digital signature, an issuance and expiration date, and 
identifiers that specify the cryptographic algorithm(s) to be used with the public key and 
signature.  X.509v3 certificates include an extensibility feature; CAs usually include 
standard extensions in their certificates to indicate which cryptographic operations the 
public key was intended to support, the policy that governed certificate issuance, and 
where to find out if the certificate has been revoked (i.e., an authoritative source for 
certificate status information).  CAs may also include “private” extensions in their 
certificates that contain information particular to an application or domain of users. 
 
A relying party is an individual or organization that relies on the certificate and the CA 
that issued the certificate to provide valid information (see Appendix A). Before a relying 
party uses the public key in a certificate, he must determine whether the key used by the 
issuer to sign this certificate can be trusted.  In the simplest case, the relying party knows 
about the issuer, and has already decided to trust certificates issued by that CA.  CAs that 
a relying party trusts directly are called trust anchors. When multiple trust anchors are 
recognized, the set of trust anchors is referred to as the trust list. 
 
In most cases, a relying party will wish to process user certificates that were signed by 
issuers other than a CA in its trust list.  To support this goal, CAs issue cross certificates 
that bind another issuer’s name to that issuer’s public key.  Cross certificates are an 
assertion that a public key may be used to verify signatures on other certificates.  A 
relying party may be able to develop a certification path – a sequence of certificates – 
demonstrating that a user’s public key certificate can be trusted, even though it was 
issued by a CA that is not in the relying party’s trust list.   All certification paths begin 
with a trust anchor, include zero or more intermediate certificates, and end with the 
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finding the appropriate intermediate certificates (a.k.a., path discovery) is one of PKI’s 
challenges. 
 
The entire path must be examined to ensure that the certificates have not been revoked, 
were issued under appropriate policies, and that each public key is suitable for the use to 
which it has been put.  This process is known as path validation.   
 
As noted above, the certificate itself will usually include a pointer to an authoritative 
source for certificate status information.  Certificate status information may be provided 
using one of two standard mechanisms: 
 
•  The most common source is a certificate revocation list, or CRL.  An X.509 CRL 
contains a list of certificates issued by that CA that have been revoked, indicates 
when they were revoked, and may include the reason for revocation (see RFC 
5280). If the serial number of an unexpired certificate does not appear on the 
CRL, then it is still valid.  CRLs are digitally signed, like a certificate, so they can 
be distributed through untrusted systems.  Most commonly, CRLs are distributed 
via LDAP
7 directories or web servers. 
•  An alternative source for this information is an Online Certificate Status Protocol 
(OCSP) responder (see RFC 2560 [RFC 2560]).  An OCSP responder is a trusted 
system, and provides signed status information, on a per certificate basis, in 
response to a request from a relying party.  Relying parties can authenticate the 
response by verifying the OCSP responder’s digital signature.  As the OCSP 
responder is providing authoritative status information, there is generally a formal 
(e.g., contractual) relationship between the CA and OCSP responder.  
 
In many cases, PKIs will also provide key recovery services (using Recovery Servers) to 
support business continuity.  Key recovery services store private keys that support key 
establishment to ensure that the plaintext of encrypted data may be recovered in the 
future.  These services can provide the private key to the user in the event of loss or 
failure of their cryptographic module, or to the user’s management when policy or legal 
requirements exist.  When supported, this service removes a key management burden 
from PKI-enabled applications. 
  
This section provides guidance for general purpose PKIs when users from different 
organizations need to support a variety of applications.  For large, general purpose PKIs, 
interoperability is an important consideration.  Less commonly, PKIs may be deployed to 
support a small, closed community of users or for a single application, where wider 
interoperability is less important.  The requirements within this section are focused on 
large, general purpose PKIs, such as the Federal PKI.  For PKIs requiring less 
interoperability, these requirements should be evaluated for appropriateness within their 
                                                 
7 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a software protocol for enabling anyone to locate 
organizations, individuals, and other resources, such as files and devices in a network, whether on the 
Internet or on a corporate intranet.  See [RFC 4511] Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The 
Protocol and [RFC 4512] Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): Directory Information Models. 
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PKIs. 
 
2.2  Security and Compliance Issues 
2.2.1  Recommended Key Sizes and Algorithms 
Table 2-1 below summarizes the recommended key sizes for key pairs used by PKI users 
and infrastructure components. The PKI uses the term digital signature key to refer to a 
private signature key or public signature verification key (as defined in Part 1) that 
provides a non-repudiation service. The term authentication key is used by the PKI to 
refer to a private authentication key or public authentication key as defined in Part 1. 
Note that both a digital signature key and an authentication key are used with a digital 
signature algorithm. 
 
The dates in this table are consistent with those that appear in Part 1, where: 
•  A digital signature key for a user is an asymmetric key pair (i.e., a private 
signature key and public signature verification key) used with a digital signature 
algorithm. A digital signature may be used to provide either an authentication or a 
non-repudiation service.  
•  A key establishment key is an asymmetric key pair used to provide key agreement 
or key transport, and 
•  A CA and OCSP responder signing key is an asymmetric key pair used to sign 
and verify certificates.  
 
Note that the dates in Table 2-1 describe the period of use for the key pair, rather than the 
expiration date of a certificate.  In the case of a digital signature certificate, if the use of 
the public key is expected to continue after certificate expiration (e.g., the public key 
used to verify signed data), then the certificate should expire at an earlier date than 
specified in the table (i.e., the certificate is used, in practice, to indicate the expiration of 
the private key associated with the public key in the certificate). For example, Federal 
PKI policy required 1024 bit RSA signature certificates to expire at the end of 2008, even 
though this key size was considered secure through 2010, since the signature on digitally 
signed documents needed to be valid for two years after the signature was applied (i.e., 
the signature on a document signed at the end of 2008 needed to be valid until the end of 
2010).  The dates in the Table may be considered to be the latest expiration date for a 
given key type and size. 
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Key Type  Time Period for 
Use 
Algorithms and Key Sizes 
Through 
12/31/2010 
RSA (1024 or 2048 bits) 
ECDSA (Curve P-256)  
Digital Signature 
keys used for 
authentication and 
non-repudiation (for 
Users or Devices) 
After 12/31/2010  RSA (2048 bits) 
ECDSA (Curve P-256)  
CA and OCSP 
Responder Signing 
Keys 
        N/A  RSA: (2048, 3072, or 4096 bits) 
ECDSA: (Curves P-256 or P-384) 
Through 
12/31/2010 
RSA (1024 or 2048 bits) 
Diffie-Hellman (1024 or 2048 bits) 
ECDH (Curve P-256)  
Key Establishment 
keys (for Users or 
Devices) 
After 12/31/2010  RSA (2048 bits) 
Diffie-Hellman (2048 bits) 
ECDH (Curves P-256 or P-384)  
 
Note that some approved algorithms and key sizes, such as DSA (1024 or 2048), are 
omitted to enhance interoperability.  RSA and ECDSA, which are included in Table 2-1 
above, have been widely deployed in PKIs. Therefore, they are recommended for use to 
enhance interoperability.  However, DSA (1024 and 2048) as specified in FIPS 186-3 
may be used as long as the required security strength is satisfied.  For ECDSA, only the 
two elliptic curves listed in Table 2-1 above of the elliptic curves are recommended for 
use in PKIs for digital signatures [FIPS 186-3].  Similarly, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
is recommended to support key establishment, rather than Elliptic Curve MQV.  As 
stated above in Section 2.1, other approved algorithms may be used where PKIs are 
deployed to support a small, closed community of users or a single application. 
 
While Table 2-1 is focused on the strength of the public key contained in a certificate, the 
strength of the digital signature on a certificate itself is equally important.  The signature 
security strength reflects the security strength of the hash algorithm, and possibly the 
padding scheme
8, in addition to the strength of the private key used to generate the 
signature.  Table 2-2 below summarizes the recommended algorithms, key sizes, hash 
functions, and padding schemes for signing certificates and CRLs by CAs, and OCSP 
status messages by OCSP responders.  In Table 2-2, the dates correspond to the signature 
generation date for non-repudiation (e.g., the date that a certificate, CRL, or OCSP status 
message was created and signed).   
                                                 
8 RSA has two padding schemes used in the PKI: PKCS #1 v1.5, and PSS. The security strength of a digital 
signature generated using ECDSA is not affected by a padding scheme.     
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Signature 
Generation Date 
Public Key Algorithms  
and Key Sizes  Hash Algorithms  Padding 
Scheme 
SHA-1  PKCS #1 v1.5  RSA (2048, 3072, or 4096 bits) 
  SHA-256  PKCS #1 v1.5 
ECDSA (Curve P-256)  SHA-256  N/A 
Through 
12/31/2009 
ECDSA (Curve P-384)  SHA-384  N/A 
SHA-1  PKCS #1 v1.5 
RSA (2048, 3072, or 4096 bits) 
SHA-256  PKCS #1 v1.5, 
PSS 
ECDSA (Curve P-256)  SHA-256  N/A 
1/1/2010 through 
12/31/2010 
ECDSA (Curve P-384)  SHA-384  N/A 
RSA (2048, 3072, or 4096 bits)  SHA-256  PKCS #1 v1.5, 
PSS 
ECDSA (Curve P-256)  SHA-256  N/A 
After 12/31/2010 
ECDSA (Curve P-384)  SHA-384  N/A 
 
 
User certificates containing RSA or finite field Diffie-Hellman public keys should be 
signed using the RSA signature algorithm.  User certificates containing elliptic curve 
public keys should be signed using ECDSA. 
 
Not all combinations of algorithms and key sizes are appropriate for the protection of 
Federal government information.  To enhance interoperability, users should obtain 
authentication, signature, and key establishment certificates with complementary 
algorithms for all public keys.
9 For most users, signature and key establishment keys 
should provide consistent cryptographic strength. Table 2-3 below shows preferred 
combinations for user keys; periods of use for these combinations should be calculated 
using the most conservative dates specified in Table 2-1. 
 
While symmetric key cryptography is not strictly required, block ciphers are used in 
practically all PKI implementations and PKI-enabled applications.  All components using 
block ciphers shall support the AES-128 algorithm.  To support legacy implementations, 
components that process RSA keys should support three key Triple-DEA (see [SP 800-
                                                 
9 In general, protocols and applications are designed to use cryptographic algorithms from one 
mathematical family.  For example, applications that encounter certificates with ECDSA digital signatures 
would expect to use elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman for key establishment services.  Users that obtain an 
ECDSA certificate (i.e., a certificate containing an ECDSA public key to be used for verifying digital 
signatures), and an RSA key establishment certificate (i.e.,  a certificate containing an RSA public key to be 
used for key establishment), for example, may find they cannot use the keys together in a single 
application.  Other combinations of certificates are commonly used (see Table 2-3). It is advisable that 
users obtain authentication, signature, and key establishment certificates that are complementary to ensure 
that the keys can be used together in applications and protocols. 
  2267]).  Components that support P-384 elliptic curve keys and the SHA-384 algorithm 
shall support AES-256.   
 
Table 2-3 Recommended Combinations of Algorithms and Key Sizes 
Authentication Key 
Type 
Signature Key  Key Establishment Key 
RSA 1024  RSA 2048  RSA 2048 
RSA 1024  RSA 2048  Diffie-Hellman 2048 
RSA 2048  RSA 2048  RSA 2048 
RSA 2048  RSA 2048  Diffie-Hellman 2048 
ECDSA P-256  ECDSA P-256  ECDH P-256 
ECDSA P-256  ECDSA P-384  ECDH P-384 
ECDSA P-384  ECDSA P-384  ECDH P-384 
 
2.3  Procurement Guidance 
The following provides guidance for those responsible for making decisions on which 
products to purchase in support of a PKI. 
 
2.3.1  CA/RA Software and Hardware: 
1.  CA and RA software shall support the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) [RFC 
4210] or Certificate Management Using CMS (CMC); see RFC 5272 [RFC 5272].  
CA software should also generate and process certificate requests using PKCS #7, 
[PKCS-7] and PKCS # 10 [PKCS-10].   
 
2.  All CAs shall support the generation of certificates and CRLs that conform to RFC 
5280.  (Specific requirements with respect to certificate and CRL extensions are 
detailed below.) 
 
3.  CAs shall be capable of issuing multiple certificates to users, and for all said 
certificates, asserting the key usage extension, including the Extended Key Usage 
extension and the “anyExtendedKeyUsage” value.  
 
4.  CAs shall be capable of including the CRL distribution points extension.  At a 
minimum, CAs shall support the inclusion of LDAP and HTTP URLs to specify the 
location of CRLs.  CAs shall be capable of specifying an authoritative OCSP 
responder in the Authority Information Access extension. 
 
5.  Each PKI has its own certificate profile, identifying certificate extensions that appear 
in the certificates and CRLs it issues.
10  CAs shall be able to generate all mandatory 
                                                 
10 This profile is often documented explicitly, but may be implicitly specified through the certificate policy. 
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Federal agencies, the following specific guidance applies: 
 
a)  CAs that implement Federal agency-specific policies shall be able to generate 
certificates and CRLs that meet the agency profile and the Federal PKI Certificate 
Profile [FPKI PROF]. 
b)  CAs that implement the Common Policy Framework [COMMON] shall be able 
to generate certificates and CRLs meeting the Shared Services Certificate and 
CRL Profile [COMMON PROF]. 
 
6.  CAs should support the inclusion of “private” extensions in certificates and CRLs.
11 
 
7.  CAs shall support at least one of the following algorithms for digitally signing 
certificates and CRLs: RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding; RSA with PSS Padding 
[RFC 3447], or ECDSA.  To maximize flexibility, CAs should support all of the 
above algorithms.
12 
 
8.  CAs shall include backup and archive capabilities to support reconstitution of the CA 
in the event of a disaster (e.g., fire, earthquake).
13  CAs should include backup and 
archive capabilities in order to establish when certificates were issued and revoked, 
and under whose authority.  
 
9.  CA/RA components shall be shipped or delivered via controlled methods that provide 
a continuous chain of accountability, from the purchase location to the CA’s or RA's 
physical location. 
 
2.3.2  OCSP Responders: 
1.  OCSP responders shall conform to RFC 2560, Online Certificate Status Protocol. 
 
2.  OCSP responders shall be capable of processing both signed and unsigned requests 
and shall be capable of processing requests that either include or omit the name of the 
relying party making the request.   However, OCSP responders may ignore signatures 
and requester names, if present. 
 
3.  OCSP responders shall be capable of processing certificate status requests and 
generating responses for non-error conditions as specified in RFC 5019 [RFC 5019].  
 
                                                 
11 Private extensions are defined by an organization to meet their own unique requirements.  Note that 
noncritical private extensions do not impact the interoperability of certificates or CRLs. 
12 The algorithm used to sign certificates and CRLs in an operational CA is dependent upon both the 
cryptographic module in use and the CA’s software.  The selected algorithm must appear in both sets of 
supported algorithms. 
13 In cases where the root key has been compromised, destroyed or lost, it is necessary to rebuild the CA 
using a backup root key, rather than simply recover the lost state of the CA. 
  244.  Where supported, the OCSP responder should sign the OCSP response with the 
algorithm used to sign the certificate.  OCSP responders shall support at least one of 
the following algorithms for digitally signing response messages: RSA with PKCS#1 
v1.5 padding; RSA with PSS Padding, or ECDSA.  The supported algorithms should 
include the algorithm(s) used by the corresponding CA when signing the certificate 
whose status is in question.  To support future algorithm transitions by the CA, OCSP 
responders should support all of the aforementioned algorithms.
14 
 
2.3.3  Cryptographic Modules 
1.  Cryptographic modules for CAs, Key Recovery Servers, and OCSP responders shall 
be hardware modules validated as meeting FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or higher.  
 
2.  Cryptographic modules for RAs should be hardware cryptographic modules validated 
as meeting FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher.   
 
3.  Relying party and user cryptographic modules shall be validated as meeting FIPS 
140-2 Level 1 or higher. 
 
2.3.4  Key Recovery Servers 
1.  If the PKI supports key establishment (i.e., certificates will include key transport or 
key agreement keys), the PKI should include a key recovery mechanism.   
 
2.  Implementations should support automated, user-initiated key recovery; key recovery 
by the organization should also be supported.
15   
 
2.3.5  Relying Party Software 
1.  Relying party path validation 
a)  Relying party implementations shall implement RFC 5280-conformant path 
validation; see RFC 5280.   
b)  Where interoperability outside a single organization (e.g., a single Federal 
agency) is required, path validation modules should conform to requirements for 
an Enterprise PVM, as specified in NIST Recommendation for X.509 Path 
Validation.
16   
                                                 
14 As with CAs, the algorithm used to sign responses in an operational OCSP responder is dependent upon 
both the cryptographic module in use and the OCSP responder’s software.  The selected algorithm must 
appear in both sets of supported algorithms.  
15 Organizational key recovery should emphasize security and privacy, rather than performance.  Dual 
control for recovery of a user’s keys by the organization is strongly recommended. 
16 This document is available in draft form and can be found at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/documents/NIST_Recommendation_for_X509_PVMs.pdf
. 
  25c)  Where interoperability across organizations is required, path validation modules 
should conform to requirements for a Bridge-Enabled PVM, as specified in NIST 
Recommendation for X.509 path validation. 
d)  Relying party implementations shall support CRLs for certificate status, and 
should support OCSP for certificate status. 
 
2.  Building certificate paths 
a)  Relying party implementations shall be able to build certification paths.   
b)  At a minimum, relying party implementations should be able to obtain CA 
certificates and CRLs using LDAP from an organizationally-designated local 
directory, as well as locations specified within a user certificate.  
c)  Implementations should support http-based certificate retrieval.  
 
3.  Relying parties that work within a single organizational PKI (e.g., a PKI that supports 
a company or agency) should be able to discover paths for user certificates issued by 
CAs that are hierarchically subordinate to the trust anchor CA.   
 
4.  Relying parties that accept certificates from other organizations should be able to 
discover paths in non-hierarchical PKIs.  
 
2.3.6  Client Software 
1.  Client implementations shall support multiple private keys and certificates for each 
end user to support different cryptographic services.  For example, the client 
implementation should support and differentiate between private keys associated 
with public keys in certificates supporting digital signatures, and private keys 
associated with public keys in certificates supporting key establishment.   
 
2.  Client cryptographic modules shall be validated at FIPS 140-2 Level 1 or higher.   
 
3.  Client implementations should support the certificate management protocol 
supported by the organization’s CA.
17 
 
2.4  Recommendations for System Installers/Administrators  
The system installer and administrator is the person (or people) who are responsible for 
establishing the PKI and who are responsible for the tasks associated with its day-to-day 
operation.  The system administrator shall ensure that end users are trained and that the 
organization’s security policy is enforced. 
 
2.4.1  Certificate Issuance 
1.  CAs shall be configured to ensure that certificates specify public keys with approved 
key sizes, valid domain parameters, and approved algorithms.  
                                                 
17 Where keys and certificates are stored on smart cards, and all updates are performed at the RA, user 
implementations need not support the certificate management protocol. 
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2.  For maximum interoperability, CAs and users should use RSA key pairs for digital 
signatures and key transport.  
 
3.  For maximum security and performance, CAs and users should use elliptic curve key 
pairs for digital signatures and key agreement. 
 
4.  When signing certificates or CRLs, CAs shall generate digital signatures as specified 
in Table 2-2.  When signing certificates or CRLs with RSA, digital signatures should 
be generated using the SHA-1 hash algorithm until 12/31/2010 to maximize 
interoperability.  
 
5.  For digital signature certificates, CAs shall sign the certificate using a digital 
signature process (i.e., signature algorithm, hash function and key) whose security 
strength is equal to or greater than the security strength of the subject public key in 
the certificate.  For key establishment certificates, CAs may sign the certificate using 
a digital signature process whose security strength is less than the security strength of 
the subject public key in the certificate
18.   
 
6.  Generating key pairs: 
a)  Users should generate their own digital signature key pairs.   
b)  The user or the PKI may generate key pairs for key establishment on the user’s 
behalf; where required, the PKI may retain copies of the key establishment private 
key to permit key recovery.   
c)  CAs should perform proof of possession on all key pairs before issuing 
certificates. 
 
7.  CAs shall obtain assurance of public key validity before issuing certificates.  
 
8.  Key usage extension. 
a)  All certificates issued shall include the key usage extension. 
b)  The key usage extension should restrict acceptance of the private key to a single 
cryptographic function: digital signatures, user authentication, or key 
establishment. 
                                                 
18 A public key certificate used for key establishment involves two keys: the subject public key, which is 
used to establish a symmetric key that will protect data, and the signing key of the Certification Authority 
(CA), which is used to sign the certificate.  The CA’s signing key needs to be secure only until the 
certificate expires, but the subject public key needs to be secure as long as the data must be secure, which 
may be long after the certificate expiration date. As long as the CA’s signing key is secure during the 
certificate’s lifetime, and the certificate has been securely archived, any break of the CA signing key after 
the expiration of the certificate does not affect the validity of the subject public key or the security that it 
(the subject public key) can provide. For example, if the security strength of the subject public key is 
greater than that of the CA’s signing key, any break of the signing key after the subject public key is signed 
does not affect the security of that public key. Therefore, it is acceptable for a key transport or key 
agreement subject public key to be stronger than the CA key used to sign a certificate containing the key 
agreement or key transport public key. 
 
  27c)  Dual-use certificates (where a single key is used for both digital signatures and 
key establishment) should not be issued to users.   
d)  Dual-use certificates may be issued to devices where required to support legacy 
applications.  
 
9.  Extended Key Usage extension.   
a)  Certificates may include the extended key usage extension to support specific 
applications (e.g., smart card logon).  
b)  If a certificate is intended for general use, in addition to some list of specific 
applications, the extended key usage extension shall also specify “Any Key 
Usage”. 
 
10. All certificates shall include the CRL distribution points extension to support the 
retrieval of status information.   
 
11. If an OCSP responder is supported, a certificate shall include an appropriate URL in 
the Authority Information Access extension. 
 
12. Certificates should be renewed before they expire and replaced if there is a change in 
the certificate’s contents such as the domain name or the embedded email address. 
 
2.4.2  Certificate Revocation Requests 
1.  CAs should be configured to automate revocation processing where practical: 
a)  CAs should be configured to authenticate and process revocation requests 
electronically.   
b)  Where the CA can authenticate a digitally signed request submitted by the user of 
the associated key pair or an RA, the request should be handled without manual 
intervention. 
 
2.  RAs should be configured to submit digitally signed revocation requests on behalf of 
users or the organization. 
 
2.4.3  Certificate Revocation List Generation 
1.  To maximize interoperability, all CAs should be configured to generate full CRLs. A 
full CRL is a single CRL that lists all revoked and unexpired certificates issued by 
this CA.   
 
2.  CAs that serve a large community should generate CRL distribution points in 
addition to full CRLs.  Each CRL distribution point lists a subset of the revoked 
certificates for a given CA.  The number of certificates covered by a CRL distribution 
point should be limited to a maximum of 250,000 to ensure that the distribution point 
CRLs do not grow to an unmanageable size. 
 
  282.4.4  PKI Repositories for the Distribution of Certificates and CRLs 
1.  PKIs should be configured to provide certificates and CRLs to requesters without 
authentication of the requester. 
 
2.  PKI repositories shall be configured to require authenticated access to modify the set 
of certificates and CRLs distributed by the repository.   
 
3.  At a minimum, repositories shall support either the HTTP version 1.1 or LDAP 
version 3 interface.   
 
4.  For maximum interoperability, both HTTP and LDAP should be supported.  
 
5.  Replication of repositories (e.g., through directory shadowing or web server 
replication) to maximize availability should be considered. 
 
6.  PKI repositories should contain all CA certificates issued by or to the corresponding 
PKI. 
 
7.  PKI repositories shall contain all current CRLs. 
 
2.4.5  OCSP Responders 
For Federal agencies, detailed configuration guidance for OCSP responders is specified 
in Draft Guidance for OCSP Responders in the U.S. Federal PKI.
19 
 
1.  If maximum interoperability is required then: 
a)  OCSP responders shall not require that requests be signed and shall not limit the 
set of relying parties to which certificate status information is provided.   
b)  The responders shall generate OCSP basic responses, and the responses shall not 
include critical extensions. 
 
2.  Where interoperability requirements are limited to a closed community: 
a)  OCSP responders may require signed requests, and may reject requests from 
entities outside that community.   
b)  OCSP response messages may include private extensions known within the target 
community. 
 
2.4.6  Backup and Archive 
1.  To maintain the availability of status information, CAs shall ensure that sufficient 
information is stored in a secure location to reconstitute the CA after a disaster.  
 
2.  CAs should archive sufficient information to establish when certificates were 
issued, and under whose authority.   
                                                 
19 Draft guidance is available at http://cio.nist.gov/esd/emaildir/lists/pkits/doc00000.doc. 
  29 
3.  As a general rule, all audit logs should be maintained, along with any certificates 
and CRLs issued by the CA.   
 
4.  User public signature verification keys should be archived, along with their 
corresponding certificates, for at least 7 ½ years after certificate expiration.   
 
2.4.7  Relying Party Integration and Configuration 
1.  Path discovery components shall be configured to enable path discovery, and 
require the retrieval of status information.   
 
2.  Status information should be accepted in both CRL and OCSP formats. 
 
3.  Relying party implementations shall be configured to recognize the smallest set 
of acceptable trust anchors possible.   
 
4.  For business-to-government and government-to-government applications, Federal 
agencies should use either the Common Policy Root CA or an agency CA that is 
cross certified with the Federal Bridge as the trust anchor.   
 
5.  For citizen-to-government applications with limited security requirements (e.g. 
Level 2 e-Authentication requirements as specified in [OMB 04-04]) and high 
interoperability requirements, agency applications may use the pre-installed trust 
anchors provided in COTS products. 
 
6.  Path validation modules: 
a)  For end user applications and applications with minimal security 
requirements, path validation modules should be configured to accept any 
valid path.   
b)  For systems with more significant security requirements (e.g., systems using 
PKI to satisfy Level 3 or Level 4 e-Authentication), path validation modules 
should be configured to only accept paths that are valid under appropriate 
policies.  
 
2.5  User Guidance (Subscribers) 
In a PKI, the subject is the identity of the user associated with a public key.  The subject 
may be a person or a device.  For the purposes of this section, the term user is either the 
person associated with a public key, or the administrator of a device associated with a 
public key. 
 
1. Users  should generate key pairs for digital signature and authentication.  
  
2.  Users may generate their own key pairs for key establishment, or the key 
establishment key pairs may be imported from a trusted source. 
 
  303. Users  shall protect the authenticators (e.g., the PIN or password) that control 
access to their private keys. 
 
4. Users  shall request the revocation of their certificates if they believe the 
authenticator or cryptographic module has been stolen, copied or compromised. 
 
5.   Users shall verify all CRLs before rejecting claimed revoked certificates in the 
CRLs.  
 
 
 
6. Users  shall control the disposition of “old” key pairs after certificates expire 
unless otherwise controlled in accordance with Federal agency policy and 
procedures   
a)  Private signature keys should be destroyed after the corresponding 
certificate(s) expire. 
b)  Private key establishment keys need not be destroyed after the corresponding 
certificate(s) expire.  The user should not destroy the private key 
establishment key until all symmetric keys established using this key have 
been recovered or otherwise protected (e.g., by encrypting under a different 
key).  Premature destruction of private key establishment keys may prevent 
recovery of the subscriber’s plaintext data.  
 
  313  Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)  
3.1    Description 
IPsec is a suite of protocols for securing Internet communications at the network layer 
and operates within the Internet Protocol (IP).  It is frequently used to establish Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs)
20, requiring both parties to share keying material, and enabling 
telecommuters or travelers to gain secure access to their business networks.  IPsec 
provides the cryptographic security functions for both versions 4 and 6 of the Internet 
Protocol.  
 
IPsec operates by inserting one of two special IPsec headers after the IP header in each 
message.  The Authentication Header (AH) provides integrity protection.  The 
Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) Header provides confidentiality and/or integrity 
protection.  Both ESP and AH provide data origin authentication, and optionally provide 
replay protection.  AH protects the IP header and the data following the IP header.  ESP, 
when applied directly to a packet (i.e., in transport mode), protects the data, but not the IP 
header.  However, ESP in tunnel mode (with a new IP header inserted) does protect the 
original IP header.  Furthermore, using ESP with automated keying protects the source 
and destination addresses in the IP header, in either transport or tunnel mode.  Since AH 
processing introduces unnecessary complexity, and since ESP can provide equivalent 
functionality, the use of AH is not recommended.   
 
There have been three versions of IPsec.
21  All new systems should implement IPsec-v3, 
as it has many enhancements not found in the previous versions.
22  However, IPsec-v2 is 
still implemented in numerous current systems, despite the fact that it is obsolete.
23 
 
Two classes of key management methods are specified for IPsec: manual keying and 
automated keying. Manual keying involves an agreement (in an unspecified manner) by 
the parties in a communication on the IPsec protections to be applied and the symmetric 
keys to be used. This has a major downside in that it severely limits the scalability of the 
security solution and requires re-keying to be done in an unspecified manner.  A Security 
Association (SA, i.e., a relationship between two or more entities that describes how each 
entity will use the security services to communicate securely) and its secret keys cannot 
be easily renewed in the cases where the SA expires, has been used for the maximum 
allowable volume of traffic, or if its keys are compromised. 
 
To use automated keying, a negotiation between peers prior to exchanging IPsec-
protected traffic determines the IPsec protections to be applied and the symmetric keys to 
be used. The same method can be used to maintain, delete, or renegotiate the SA (e.g., to 
rekey).  This approach permits a decoupling of the key management mechanism from the 
                                                 
20 See SP 800-77, “Guide to IPsec VNPs” [SP 800-77]. 
21 There are no generally accepted names for IPsec-v3 and IPsec-v2; these terms are used in this document to make the 
requirements more understandable 
22 IPsec-v3 is specified in RFC 4301, RFC 4302, and RFC 4303. 
23 IPsec-v2 is specified in RFC 2401, RFC 2402 and RFC 2406. 
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methods without having to modify other security mechanisms.  
 
The preferred automated keying method is IKE, the Internet Key Exchange protocol that 
was designed specifically for use with IPsec.  IKE generates the necessary keying 
material for IPsec via an authenticated secure channel between the two IKE peers.  There 
are two versions of IKE in use: IKEv1 [RFC 2407, RFC 2408 and RFC 2409] and IKEv2 
[RFC 4306 and RFC 4718]; both versions perform mutual authentication, and establish 
and maintain security associations. SAs will be valid for a specified period of time or 
volume of traffic.  These two versions of IKE are not interoperable. 
 
Table 3-1 provides the IETF reference materials for versions 2 and 3 of IPsec. 
 
Table 3-1. Summary of References for IPsec 
Version  Security 
Architecture  Privacy Authentication Automated Key 
Management 
IPsec-v2 
RFC 
2401[RFC 
2401] 
RFC 2406 
[RFC 2406]
RFC 2402[RFC 
2402], RFC 
2406 
RFC 2407, RFC 
2408, RFC 2409 
IPsec-v3  RFC 4301 
[RFC 4301] 
RFC 4303 
[RFC 4303]
RFC 4302 [RFC 
4302], RFC 
4303 
RFC 4306, RFC 
4718 
 
The IPsec security mechanisms are not tied to any specific cryptographic algorithms; in 
fact, many algorithms and modes have IETF Requests For Comment (RFCs) describing 
their use with IPsec. This, however, can result in a situation where there are so many 
choices for typical system administrators to make that it is difficult to achieve 
interoperability. To improve interoperability in IPsec-v3, two named cipher suites: VPN-
A and VPN-B
24  that cover typical security policies, were specified [RFC 4308].  
However, VPN-B shall not be used because VPN-B contains AES-XCBC-MAC-96, 
which is not NIST-approved. VPN-A shall not be used after the end of the year 2010. 
Implementers may allow the individual selection of security algorithms (i.e., rather than 
selecting a pre-specified suite of algorithms), but users must be aware that picking non-
standard groupings of algorithms may result in limited interoperability.  However, when 
IPsec is used in the context of a VPN, security policy can be centrally managed, thus 
ensuring interoperability without the use of pre-defined cipher suites.  Complete IETF 
algorithm guidance is provided in [RFC 4835] (for AH and ESP), RFC 4307 [RFC 4307] 
(for IKEv2) and [RFC 4109] (for IKEv1).   
 
                                                 
24 SP 500-267 lists VPN-A and VPN-B as recommended cipher suites. However, the recommendations in 
SP 500-267 are superseded by the requirements/recommendations in this section. 
  333.2  Security and Compliance Issues 
3.2.1  Cryptographic Algorithms 
Table 3-2 below gives cryptographic algorithm recommendations for use within IPsec.  
The algorithms that are specified for IKE are used to protect IKE’s own traffic. The ESP 
and AH algorithms are used to provide IPsec protection to data traffic; for these 
algorithms to be used within ESP or AH, IKE must be capable of negotiating their use. 
 
Table 3-2. Cryptographic Algorithm Recommendations
25 
Protocol  Cryptographic 
Service  Algorithm/Mode IETF 
Requirement  
Federal 
Requirement 
ESP Encryption 
TDEA in CBC 
mode 
 
[RFC 2451], [RFC 
4835] 
MUST 
Mandatory 
Must use with 
three distinct 
keys 
ESP Encryption 
AES with 128-bit 
keys in CBC 
mode 
 
[RFC 3602], [RFC 
4835] 
MUST 
Mandatory 
ESP Encryption 
AES-128 in 
Counter mode 
 
[RFC 3686], [RFC 
4835] 
SHOULD 
Optional, 
however, 
must be used 
with integrity 
protection  
ESP or AH  Integrity 
Protection 
HMAC SHA1-96 
 
[RFC 2404], [RFC 
4835] 
MUST 
Mandatory 
ESP or AH  Integrity 
Protection 
HMAC SHA-
256-128 
 
[RFC 4868] 
SHOULD  Optional
 
                                                 
25 Column four lists IETF conformance requirements as specified in the RFCs by using the three IETF 
requirement levels: MUST, SHOULD and MAY. See RFC 2119 [RFC 2119] for definitions of these 
requirement levels and further information on IETF Conformance language.   
 
Column five states Federal conformance requirements using two levels: Mandatory and Optional. 
 Mandatory means that the feature is required, and Optional means the technique is permitted. 
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Service  Algorithm/Mode IETF 
Requirement 
Federal 
Requirement 
ESP 
Encryption and 
Integrity 
Protection 
AES-128 in 
Galois/Counter 
Mode 
 
[RFC 4106], [RFC 
4835] 
 
Optional 
ESP 
Encryption and 
Integrity 
Protection 
AES-128 in 
Counter mode 
with CBC-MAC 
 
[RFC 4309], [RFC 
4835] 
MAY 
Optional 
ESP or AH  Integrity 
Protection 
AES-128 in 
GMAC Mode 
 
[RFC 4543] 
  Optional 
IKEv1 or 
IKEv2  Encryption  TDEA in CBC 
mode  
[RFC 4109], [RFC 
4307]  
MUST 
Mandatory 
 with three 
distinct keys 
IKEv1 or 
IKEv2  Encryption  AES-128 in CBC 
mode  
[RFC 4109], [RFC 
4307] 
SHOULD 
Optional 
IKEv1 or 
IKEv2 
Pseudo-random 
function  HMAC-SHA1  
[RFC 4109], RFC 
4307] 
MUST 
Mandatory 
IKEv1 or 
IKEv2 
Pseudo-random 
Function 
HMAC-SHA-
256 
 
[RFC 4868] 
SHOULD 
Optional 
 
IKEv1 or 
IKEv2 
Diffie-Hellman 
Group 2  1024-bit MODP  
[RFC 4109], [RFC 
4307] 
MUST 
Mandatory 
IKEv2  Diffie-Hellman  
Group 24 
2048-bit MODP 
 
[RFC 5114] 
 
 
Mandatory 
 
IKEv1 or 
IKEv2 
Diffie-Hellman 
Group 14 
2048-bit MODP 
 
[RFC 4109], RFC 
4307] 
SHOULD 
Optional 
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Service  Algorithm/Mode IETF 
Requirement 
Federal 
Requirement 
IKEv1 or 
IKEv2  Integrity  HMAC-SHA1-
96  
[RFC 4109], [RFC 
4307] 
MUST 
Mandatory 
IKEv1 or 
IKEv2  Integrity  HMAC-
SHA256-128  
[RFC 4868] 
SHOULD  Optional 
IKEv1  Peer 
Authentication 
RSA or DSA 
with SHA1  
[RFC 4109] 
SHOULD (RSA) 
MAY (DSA) 
Optional 
IKEv2  Peer 
Authentication  RSA with SHA1  [RFC 4306] 
MUST  Mandatory 
IKEv2  Peer 
Authentication  DSA with SHA1  [RFC 4306] 
MAY  Optional 
 
 
 
ESP provides options of NULL integrity protection or NULL encryption (RFC 4835 
[RFC 4835] and RFC 2410 [RFC 2410]) which means no integrity protection is applied 
or no encryption is used, respectively, but not both at the same time as specified in RFC 
4835. NULL integrity protection (often referred to as NULL authentication) is used for 
situations where confidentiality is required without the need for integrity protection.  
NULL integrity protection shall not, and in fact cannot, be used with NULL encryption. 
ESP, for example, could send unencrypted packets, (encryption set to NULL), but would 
be required to integrity protect them; for example by using HMAC-SHA1.  On the other 
hand, ESP could send packets encrypted with AES-128 in CBC mode but omit the 
integrity check, (integrity protection set to NULL). However, to be compliant with this 
Recommendation, IPsec (ESP)-protected traffic shall always be integrity-protected, 
either through the use of an integrity-protection algorithm such as HMAC-SHA1-96 or 
through the use of a combined-mode algorithm such as AES-128 in Galois/Counter 
Mode.  Therefore, encrypted ESP shall not be used with no integrity-protection. 
 
When IPsec-protected traffic is integrity-protected, an Integrity Check Value (ICV) is 
stored in the Integrity Check Value field of the ESP payload; see RFC 4303, or in the 
Integrity Check Value field of the Authentication Header (AH); see RFC 4302. (This 
field is referred to as the “Authentication Data” field in IPsec V2 [RFCs 2406 and 2402]).   
 
In the case of HMAC for integrity protection, the length of the ICV value is at most the 
size of the output value of the hash function.  For IPsec applications, the ICV value shall 
be truncated to 96 and 128 bits for HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA256, respectively, 
RFC 4307 [RFC 4307] and RFC 4868 [RFC 4868].   
 
Although the IETF is transitioning to AES-XCBC-MAC, [RFC 3566 and RFC 4434], 
and also allows the use of HMAC-MD5 (not shown in the table), neither is approved for 
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be used for integrity protection. 
 
A new class of algorithms, called combined-mode algorithms, appears in the above table.  
They can be negotiated by IKE and used within IPsec-v3 cipher suites.  These algorithms 
provide both encryption and integrity protection.  Two combined-mode algorithms have 
been approved for Federal government use: AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [RFC 
4106] and AES in counter mode with CBC-MAC (AES-CCM) [RFC 4309].   
 
There is also a variant of AES-GCM, referred to as AES-GMAC [RFC 4543] , that 
provides integrity protection but does not provide encryption.  This mode can be used 
within either the ESP or AH header.   
 
The maximum size of the ICV for AES-CCM, AES-GCM and AES-GMAC is 16 bytes.  
Implementations shall support a size of 16 bytes for these three algorithms [RFCs 4309, 
4106, 4543].   
 
AES-GCM, AES-CCM, AES-CTR, and AES-GMAC shall not be used with manually 
distributed keys.  If the counter value, in AES-CTR or AES-CCM, or the IV value, in 
AES-GCM or AES-GMAC, is used for more than one packet with the same key, the 
security of the algorithm’s confidentiality mechanism is compromised.  Since manual 
keying presents a major challenge to this limit, it shall not be used with these algorithms.  
Automated keying using IKE establishes secret keys for the two peers within each 
Security Association, with an extremely small probability of duplicate keys.   
 
In previous IETF guidance, DES using the CBC mode [RFC 2405] was mandatory-to-
implement; however, this algorithm shall not be used to protect information. 
 
IPsec allows the individual selection of security algorithms.  As an example, an 
implementer using Table 3-2 and following the guidance of Part 1 of SP 800-57, could 
select the following algorithms to form an IPsec suite with an overall security strength of 
80 bits: 
•  ESP Encryption:  AES in CBC mode 
•  ESP Integrity Protection: HMAC-SHA1 
•  IKEv2 Encryption: AES in CBC mode 
•  IKEv2 Pseudo-random function:  HMAC-SHA1 
•  IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman group: 1024-bit MODP 
•  IKEv2 Integrity: HMAC-SHA1 
•  IKEv2 Peer Authentication: 1024-bit RSA with SHA-1 
 
Note that if the implementer wanted to ensure a security strength of 112 bits, he would 
have to make the following changes to the suite above: 
•  IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman group: 2048-bit MODP 
•  IKEv2 Peer Authentication: 2048-bit RSA with SHA-256 
 
The Suite-B-GCM-128 and Suite-B-GCM-256 suites are both defined in RFC 4869 [RFC 
4869].  At present, these cipher suites are not widely available or deployed.  SP 500-267 
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implementations should be procured that support these cipher suites, and they should be 
selected for use wherever very high performance and security strength are required.  As 
discussed above, AES-GCM is a combined-mode algorithm that provides both encryption 
and integrity protection; therefore these suites provide integrity, despite the fact the 
integrity mechanism is listed in RFC 4869 as NULL for both suites. 
3.2.2  Additional Recommendations 
 
1.   The Authentication Header (AH) should not be used in IPsec version 3.   
 
2.   IKE should be used for automated key management to ensure a re-keying capability 
and scalability. 
 
3.   Once an ESP Security Association has expired or is no longer in use, its ESP 
encryption keys shall continue to be protected by the system and kept secret as long 
as the data they were used to protect needs to be kept secret. 
 
3.3  Procurement Guidance 
These recommendations are written to assist individuals responsible for selecting security 
products that include IPsec for the security of the IP layer. 
 
1.  Any IPsec system for use within the Federal government should include an IKE 
implementation for automated key management.  
 
2.   IPsec implementations shall include approved algorithms for each IPsec security 
component.  In addition, the implementation should be capable of using one or more 
of the approved cipher suites specified in Section 3.2.   Being capable of using one or 
more of these cipher suites will improve interoperability. 
 
3. IPsec  implementations  should include the algorithms used in the Suite B cipher 
suites. 
 
3.4  Recommendations for System Installers 
Systems installers are those individuals that install products that include IPsec for 
security. 
 
1. IKE  should be used for automated key management within any IPsec system. 
 
2. NULL  encryption  shall only be employed when integrity protection is required, but 
confidentiality is not needed.   
 
3. Installers  should select approved algorithms for each security component, as 
specified in Section 3.2. 
 
  383.5  Recommendations for System Administrators 
System administrators are those individuals responsible for the day-to-day functioning of 
the security product containing IPsec.  System administrators shall: 
 
1.   Ensure that end users are properly trained and that the organization’s security policy 
is enforced. 
 
2.  Ensure that a key used by the product is protected throughout its lifespan. 
 
3.6  Recommendations for End Users 
An end user is the individual using a product that relies on IPsec for security.  End users 
shall: 
 
1.  Be aware of and trained to follow the organization’s security policy for using the 
product. 
 
2.  Operate their system as instructed by their organization and system administrator. 
 
 
 
 
 
  394  Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL)  
4.1  Description 
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocols are the 
primary end-to-end security protocols used to protect information on the Internet. TLS is 
an enhanced version of SSL; the protocols are similar, but not identical.  The Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) governs the TLS protocol [RFC 5246]. The information 
in this section generally applies to both TLS and SSL, except where otherwise noted.  
Only the term TLS will be used in the text, except when it is necessary to make a 
distinction. 
 
TLS is a robust protocol that is used to protect various links (e.g. authentication server to 
a wireless access point or the e-mail link between client and server).  Specific guidance 
could vary greatly, based on the intended application.  The current discussion has, 
therefore, primarily been limited to the classic scenario where a browser is acting as a 
client for a human user, and is interfacing with a web site.  Some of the other applications 
of TLS (for example, dedicated network infrastructure applications primarily involving 
machines with no human user) may not require all of the features of general purpose web 
browsers and servers.  Moreover, some cipher suites, as indicated below, are primarily 
intended for these infrastructure or more restricted applications. 
 
A TLS session occurs between a client (typically an end user’s web browser) and a server 
(typically a web server belonging to an entity with which the end user wants to conduct 
business or needs to exchange information).  Symmetric keys for a session are 
determined during a protocol involving either Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement or 
RSA key transport.  The latter method implicitly authenticates the server to the client.  In 
a DH key agreement, the server authenticates itself by supplying a signed, static DH key 
in a certificate or by signing an ephemeral DH key and sending a certificate with its 
public signing key.  Thus, the server will always send a certificate, with either a signing 
key or a key-establishment key.  The server may request a certificate from the client.  
Except for non-Suite B static-static DH key-agreement, client certificates will always 
contain a signing key.  An “anonymous” exchange, i.e., without server authentication, 
shall not be used by implementations conforming to this Recommendation.   Static-static 
DH key establishment should not be used by implementations conforming to this 
Recommendation. 
 
A TLS session begins with a cryptographic negotiation between the client and the server 
to select a suite of algorithms to be used in the session (often called a cipher suite) and to 
establish a set of cryptographic keys to be used for a variety of functions throughout the 
session.  This negotiation takes the form of a series of "handshake" messages between the 
client and server.  The client states the “cipher suites” that it can handle in the order that 
it prefers them and provides a non-secret random nonce.  A cipher suite bundles the 
choice of key-establishment method (e.g., RSA key transport or DH key agreement 
method), symmetric key algorithm and data-integrity hash function to be used into a 
single value.  The server then selects the "cipher suite" to be used from the list provided 
by the client, and provides its own random nonce and a certificate containing a signing or 
  40key-establishment key.  The server may also request certificate-based client 
authentication during the handshake.
26  Session keys are then established in accordance 
with the selected cipher suite, with the random numbers providing assurance of liveliness 
and freshness to the derived keys.   
 
When only the server supplies a certificate, the TLS protocol provides for integrity and 
authentication services to a client whose identity has not necessarily been verified.  This 
is sufficient under many circumstances, such as when TLS is used to protect passwords 
or credit card numbers during transactions over the Internet.  For example, if an end user 
is trying to purchase something from Acme Flowers online, he wants to be certain that he 
is doing business with Acme Flowers (and not Acme Flours, the credit card thief), but the 
Acme Flowers server may only be concerned that the credit card number supplied is 
valid.  In this case authentication of the end user’s identity (and his authority to use the 
credit card supplied) could be handled outside of the TLS protocol (e.g., by contacting 
the credit card company to verify the validity of the credit card number).   
 
After completion of the handshake sequence, TLS provides a secure communications 
channel between the server and client for the duration of a communications session.  All 
cipher suites provide authentication and integrity protection for transferred data, and most 
TLS cipher suites also provide encryption.  All TLS cipher suites recommended in this 
document provide authentication and integrity.  Most also provide encryption.  If 
encryption is provided, data is encrypted when sent, and decrypted when received.  TLS 
does not, however, provide a cryptographic non-repudiation service to allow a validation 
of the session data or authentication after the communications session has ended, e.g., by 
a third party. 
 
4.2  Security and Compliance Issues 
4.2.1  General 
1.  Servers make the selection of the cipher suite to be used, based on the choices 
offered by the client during the handshake protocol. Therefore, if a client offers 
any cipher suite not listed in the tables 4-1 through 4-4, the server might select it, 
even when the client indicates (by the order of its list of suites) that its preference 
is for another cipher suite.     
 
2.  Symmetric key sizes shall be compliant with guidance in Part 1, and public key 
sizes shall be consistent with guidance in the PKI section above.
27  Clients shall 
not accept any certificate signed using a key smaller than the approved key size 
                                                 
26 In the initial Client Hello Message the client proposes a list of all the TLS versions and cipher suites that 
it can use, and, in the Server Hello reply, the server selects a version and cipher suite from the choices 
offered by the client.  TLS accommodates several versions (1.0 and 1.1, and 1.2) as well as a bewildering 
number of cipher suites.  While the ordering of the cipher suites in the Client Hello message is supposed to 
indicate the order of the client’s preference, experimentation reveals that few servers honor this; most 
simply follow their own preference, if it is anywhere on the client’s list. 
27 See Part 1 Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2. 
  41for the date of certificate verification by the client.  This is generally 
accomplished through control of the root certificate key-store.
28  
  
3.  Hash functions used during the signing of TLS certificates shall be consistent 
with the public key sizes, as given in Section 5.6.1 of Part 1.  
 
4.  In choosing algorithm suites, Federal agencies need to consider the value or 
sensitivity of the information being protected and how long it must be protected 
(see Part 1, Section 6).  Public keys contained in certificates (i.e., subject public 
keys) that are used only for authentication need only be large enough that they are 
secure at the time they are used in a TLS session. However, while TLS does not 
create encrypted files that are saved, an eavesdropper could record a TLS session 
and attack it at a later time when more powerful technology is available.   This 
should be taken into consideration when determining the security strength needed 
for the session. 
 
TLS cipher suites have the form: 
 
TLS_key_establishment_alg_WITH_encryption alg_message authentication_alg.
29 
 
For example, 
 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. 
 
The “TLS” distinguishes these cipher suites from SSL protocol suites.  In the example, 
the key establishment method is the RSA public key algorithm.  For this example, the 
server provides a public key certificate containing an RSA modulus and encryption 
exponent.  The AES block cipher algorithm is used with 128-bit keys in cipher block 
chaining (CBC) mode to encrypt data and HMAC_SHA1 is used to provide integrity 
protection.  Acceptable combinations of algorithms are referenced in the handshake 
messages with a two-byte indicator assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA). 
 
Not all cryptographic algorithms available for use are appropriate for the protection of 
Federal government information.  Federal servers and clients shall use approved 
algorithms for transmitting information.  Federal clients should support the use of un-
approved algorithms in receiving information in accordance with organizational policy, 
in order to support interoperability.
   Not all combinations of algorithms are appropriate 
for the protection of Federal government information; most options that use AES or 3-
key TDEA (also called 3DES in TLS cipher suites) are acceptable.  The IETF identifies 
one cipher suite as mandatory-to-implement for TLS version 1.2: 
 
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. 
                                                 
28 See Section 2 above 
29  Beginning with TLS 1.2, the cipher suite must explicitly designate the PRF (pseudo-random function) 
for deriving keying material in its definition. TLS 1.2 has chosen a default PRF, based on HMAC-SHA256 
for use with existing cipher suites (Section 5, [RFC 5246]). 
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As described in [RFC 5246], all implementations are required to include this particular 
cipher suite.  All TLS cipher suites begin with “TLS” (this distinguishes them from the 
original SSL protocol that was the ancestor of TLS).  “TLS” is followed by a key 
establishment method; in the cipher suite example given above, this is the RSA public 
key algorithm.  For this method, the server is required to have a server public key key 
establishment certificate using the RSA algorithm.  “WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA” 
specifies the cipher mechanism actually used to transfer “payload data.”  In this example, 
the AES block cipher is used with 128-bit keys in cipher block chaining mode, and 
HMAC-SHA1 provides integrity protection.   
 
4.2.2  Recommended Cipher Suites for Federal Government Use 
A large number of cipher suites have been defined for TLS.  Many are not suitable for 
Federal government use.  The cipher suites listed in tables 4.1 through 4.4 may be used to 
protect Federal government information.  Anonymous cipher suites that do not 
authenticate the server, or that use HMAC-MD5 or unapproved encryption algorithms 
shall not be used to protect Federal government information and are not included in the 
tables below.  Four tables are provided: Conventional Public Key cipher suites, Elliptic 
Curve cipher suites, Pre-shared Key cipher suites and Elliptic Curve-AES suites that are 
specific to TLS version 1.2. 
 
Conventional public key cipher suites with HMAC-SHA1 are listed in Table 4-1.  All 
suites listed in Table 4-1 are allowed for use in protecting Federal information.  The 
cipher suites with the SHA suffix all use HMAC-SHA1 to authenticate and provide 
integrity protection for payload data, and use the RSA, Diffie-Hellman and DSA public 
key algorithms for key establishment and server authentication.  These cipher suites may 
be used with TLS Versions 1.0, 1.1 or 1.2.  These cipher suites use the MD5/SHA1 
pseudorandom function (PRF) in TLS 1.0 or 1.1, and use HMAC-SHA256 PRF in TLS 
1.2.  Similar suites, shown with the SHA256 suffix, use HMAC-SHA256 for integrity 
protection and the HMAC-SHA256 PRF for key derivation. These latter suites were 
designed for use with TLS v1.2. 
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30: Conventional Public Key Cipher Suites Using HMAC-SHA1 and 
HMAC-SHA256 
SUITE  Key 
Exchange  Encryption  TLS 
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA RSA  NULL  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA **  RSA  3DES_EDE_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA* RSA  AES_128_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 RSA AES_128_CBC  1.2 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA  AES_256_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 RSA AES_256_CBC  1.2 
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DH_DSS  3DES_EDE_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DH_RSA  3DES_EDE_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
***  DHE_DSS 3DES_EDE_CBC 1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DHE_RSA 3DES_EDE_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DH_DSS  AES_128_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DH_RSA  AES_128_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE_DSS  AES_128_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE_RSA AES_128_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DH_DSS  AES_256_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DH_RSA  AES_256_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE_DSS  AES_256_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE_RSA AES_256_CBC  1.0, 1.1, 
1.2 
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_128_CBC  1.2 
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_128_CBC  1.2 
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE_DSS AES_128_CBC  1.2 
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE_RSA AES_128_CBC 1.2 
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_256_CBC  1.2 
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_256_CBC  1.2 
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE_DSS AES_256_CBC  1.2 
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE_RSA AES_256_CBC 1.2 
 
                                                 
30 This table has been updated since the document was first published in December 2009. 
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* This cipher suite is named by IETF as mandatory-to-implement for TLS version 1.2 
[RFC 5246]. 
** This cipher suite is named by IETF as mandatory-to-implement for TLS version 1.1 
[RFC 4346] 
*** This cipher suite is named by IETF as mandatory-to-implement for TLS version 1.0 
[RFC 2246]. 
 
Elliptic curve cipher suites using HMAC-SHA1 are listed in Table 4-2.  The cipher suites 
with SHA suffix all use HMAC-SHA1 for payload data integrity and use Elliptic Curve 
algorithms for key agreement.  They may use either the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm (ECDSA) or RSA for server authentication.  These cipher suites may be used 
with TLS Versions 1.0, 1.1 or 1.2.  The SHA256/SHA384 suffix means that similar 
cipher suites have also been defined, as of TLS 1.2, which use HMAC-SHA256 or 
HMAC-SHA384 for integrity protection and HMAC-SHA256/HMAC-SHA384 PRF for 
key derivation, replacing SSL’s original MD5/SHA1 PRF.  ECDHE denotes the use of a 
key exchange algorithm in which each side (client and server) each generate an elliptic 
curve Diffie-Hellman ephemeral key pair for use in that particular TLS session. 
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SHA256/HMAC-SHA384 
SUITE  Key Exchange       Encryption 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH_ECDSA  3DES_EDE_CBC
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH_ECDSA  AES_128_CBC 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH_ECDSA  AES_128_CBC 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH_ECDSA  AES_256_CBC 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE_ECDSA  3DES_EDE_CBC
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE_ECDSA  AES_128_CBC 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE_ECDSA  AES_128_CBC 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE_ECDSA  AES_256_CBC 
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH_RSA  3DES_EDE_CBC
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH_RSA  AES_128_CBC 
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH_RSA  AES_256_CBC 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE_RSA  3DES_EDE_CBC
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE_RSA  AES_128_CBC 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE_RSA  AES_128_CBC 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE_RSA  AES_256_CBC 
Pre-shared key (PSK) cipher suites using HMAC-SHA1 are listed in Table 4-3; pre-
shared keys shall be distributed in a secure manner, such as secure manual distribution or 
using a digital signature or key establishment certificate.  These cipher suites all use 
HMAC-SHA1 to authenticate and provide integrity protection for payload data.  They 
employ a pre-shared key for entity authentication (for both the server and client) and may 
also use RSA or ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) algorithms for key establishment.  For 
example, when DHE is used, the result of the Diffie Hellman computation is combined 
with the pre-shared key and other input to determine the pre-master secret.  
The pre-shared key shall have minimum security strength of 112-bits.  Because these 
cipher suites require pre-shared keys, these suites are not generally applicable to classic 
secure web site applications and are not expected to be widely supported in web browser 
clients or general web servers.  NIST suggests that these suites be considered in particular 
for infrastructure applications, particularly if frequent authentication of the network 
entities is required.  These cipher suites may be used with TLS Versions 1.0, 1.1 or 1.2. 
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SUITE 
Key 
Exchange      Encryption 
TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA PSK  3DES_EDE_CBC 
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA PSK AES_128_CBC 
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA PSK AES_256_CBC 
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DHE_PSK 3DES_EDE_CBC 
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE_PSK AES_128_CBC 
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE_PSK AES_256_CBC 
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA RSA_PSK  3DES_EDE_CBC 
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RSA_PSK AES_128_CBC 
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA_PSK AES_256_CBC 
 
“Suite B Profile for TLS” [RFC 5430] introduces six new cipher suites for TLS 1.2. Four 
of them use only Suite B algorithms as listed in Table 4-4.  These cipher suites are a 
departure from earlier TLS cipher suites in several respects, and only work with TLS 
version 1.2, which allows the negotiation of the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used in 
the process of deriving the symmetric keys (used to protect payload data) from the “pre-
master secret” arrived at by the key agreement operation.  Earlier TLS versions (1.1 and 
1.0) use the original SSL PRF, a combination of MD5 and SHA-1 to derive keying 
material.  The hash function used for data integrity was separate and negotiated as part of 
the cipher suite. For these cipher suites, ECDHE is used for key establishment.  
Moreover, TLS 1.2 adds authenticated encryption as a symmetric cipher type.  The Suite 
B cipher suites all specify AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) or Cipher Block 
Chaining (CBC) for encryption protection.  In addition to the encryption protection, 
GCM also provides integrity protection.  The AES GCM cipher suites offer the potential 
for higher performance than the AES CBC suites, while elliptic curve key establishment 
also offers performance advantages over the RSA alternatives and at higher security 
strengths.  These cipher suites are too new to yet be widely available or deployed, but 
NIST suggests that, wherever practical, servers and clients be procured that support these 
cipher suites, and that they be selected for use wherever very high performance and 
security strength are required.  The other two suites are 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA and 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA. These are not Suite B cipher 
suites. However, they are used for TLS 1.2 or later versions to provide backward 
compatibility with TLS 1.1 or earlier versions. 
 
Table 4-4: TLS 1.2-Suite B Cipher Suites 
Suite  MAC  PRF 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Galois  Ctr.  P_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Galois  Ctr.  P_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 HMAC  P_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 HMAC  P_SHA384
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The following recommendations are for any individual that makes a purchasing decision 
for acquiring a TLS/SSL component.  Recommendations for purchasing are: 
 
General requirements: 
 
1.  New procurements of clients and servers shall support TLS (SSL 3.0 or higher). 
2. Implementations  shall support approved algorithms (see Section 4.2 above). 
3. Implementations  shall support client authentication using public key certificates. 
4. Implementations  shall use an approved random bit generator specified in SP 800-
90. 
 
Server implementations: 
 
1. Web server implementations should support the following cipher suites: 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
2. Implementations  shall protect the server’s private key from unauthorized 
disclosure. 
3. Implementations  should select cipher suites in the order of preference submitted 
by the client. 
 
 
Client implementations:  
 
1.  Federal client implementations should support at least one of the following four 
cipher suites:  
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
 
and at least one of the following two cipher suites: 
 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. 
 
2.  Client implementations should allow system administrators to provide the list of 
cipher suites to be provided to the server in order of preference. 
3.  Client implementations shall support the recognition and verification of the 
certificate path for the server’s certificate before trusting the server’s certificate 
(see Section 2 above). 
  484.  Client implementations shall be capable of verifying that the identifier presented 
in the server’s certificate matches the identifier displayed by the browser. 
5.  Client implementations should give the end user an opportunity to verify that the 
site named in the certificate and displayed by the browser is consistent with the 
site that the end user was attempting to reach. 
6.  Client implementations for human users shall provide an indication to the user 
(e.g, by generating a message) if the site named in the certificate does not match 
the URL
31 that the end user requested. 
7.  Client implementations shall be capable of supporting a well-managed root 
certificate key-store (see Section 2 above.) 
 
4.4  Recommendations for System Installers 
The system installer is the individual(s) that installs the TLS/SSL application and 
performs the initial configuration of the system.  
 
System installers should: 
 
1.  Configure the root certificate store appropriately (see Section 2)
32.  
2.  Disable unapproved cipher suites, wherever possible. 
3.  Disable SSL 2.0 (most clients allow this). 
4.  Properly configure and install client certificates, in accordance with applicable 
policy.  
5.  Configure client implementations to provide a list of cipher suites to the server in 
order of preference if allowed by the application. 
6.  Configure server implementations to select the client’s most preferred cipher suite 
from the cipher suite lists presented by the clients in their ClientHello messages. 
7.  Ensure that server certificates are not expired and that they chain to a CA root 
certificate that is normally in the root store of the intended user population. 
8.  The public keys in certificates should not be used for multiple purposes (e.g., 
digital signatures and key establishment). However, TLS applications use the 
RSA server keys for both key agreement and server authentication, and this is 
acceptable because it is a carefully analyzed key agreement scheme. 
9.  Systems shall be configured to use approved algorithms and key sizes. 
10. Federal government servers should be configured to include the following cipher 
suites: 
 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
                                                 
31 Uniform Resource Locator; the unique address for a file (e.g., a web page) that is accessible on the 
Internet. 
32 Note that some common desktop operating systems permit centralized management of root stores; 
however, many systems and browsers are shipped pre-configured with hundreds of root certificates pre- 
installed. 
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TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. 
11. Federal government clients should be configured to include at least one of the 
following four cipher suites: 
 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
 
and at least one of the following two cipher suites: 
 
  TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA   
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. 
 
4.5  Recommendations for System Administrators 
The System Administrator is the individual who runs the TLS/SSL application on a day-
to-day basis and, on client implementations, interacts with the end user. This includes 
acquiring certificates for the server and assisting the user in acquiring certificates.  The 
system administrator shall ensure that end users are properly trained and that the 
organization’s security policy for using the product is enforced. 
 
System administrators should: 
1.  Obtain and install an appropriate server certificate with an appropriate strength 
public key that can be verified using the SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-384 hash 
algorithm. 
2.  Maintain the server such that it only accepts approved algorithms and cipher 
suites that use 3TDES or AES for encryption. 
3.  Configure the client system to provide the list of cipher suites to the server in the 
order of their preference with the most preferred cipher suite presented first and 
the least preferred cipher suite presented last. 
 
If client authentication is to be used, system administrators should:  
1.  Maintain the root and intermediate certificate store for the intended client 
certificates,   
2.  Support policy processing and path discovery according to organizational policy 
if they are used, and  
3.  Support CRL or OCSP responder processing. 
 
4.6  Recommendations for End Users 
An end user is the individual using a client to access the system. End users shall: 
 
1.  Operate their client systems as instructed by their organization and system 
administrator. 
  502.  Protect the private key associated with the public key contained in the user’s 
certificate if it is contained outside the client (e.g., on a smart card), as advised by 
the system administrator. 
3.  Look for browser indicators that a secure session is in progress (e.g., Internet 
Explorer’s closed padlock) 
4.  Verify that the site named in the certificate and displayed by the browser is 
consistent with the site that the end user is attempting to reach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  515  Secure/Multipart Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) 
5.1  Description 
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) provides a consistent way to 
send and receive secure Internet mail. S/MIME is a set of specifications that are defined 
by a series of IETF RFCs, namely RFC 3851 [RFC 3851]
33, RFC 5652 [RFC 5652], RFC 
2045 [RFC 2045], RFC 2046 [RFC 2046], RFC 2047 [RFC 2047], RFC 2048 [RFC 
2048], and RFC 2049 [RFC 2049].  S/MIME provides the following cryptographic 
security services for electronic messaging applications: 
 
•  Authentication of a sending party using digital signatures,  
•  Message integrity and non-repudiation of origin using digital signatures, and  
•  Confidentiality using encryption. 
 
S/MIME, therefore, requires a suite of algorithms for creating digital signatures, 
generating hash values, establishing keys and encrypting the content of the email, as well 
as some means of establishing and sharing digital identities.  Federal implementations 
rely on a public key infrastructure, specifically X.509 PKI, to establish S/MIME user 
identities, to bind those identities to the user’s public key through public key certificates, 
to provide digital signatures and to provide keys to be used for content encryption or to 
establish symmetric keys for use on a per message basis.  For detailed information on 
PKIs, see Section 2 of this Recommendation. 
 
Stored electronic mail encompasses key management issues associated with encrypted 
file integrity and with transmission over a network.  It is therefore necessary 1) to 
establish pair-wise and/or multicast (sent to more than one recipient) key management 
relationships between the sender and receiver(s) and 2) to securely store the key(s) 
associated with encrypted email until it is no longer necessary for a recipient to be able to 
decrypt or verify the integrity of the email.   
 
S/MIME is not restricted to email; it can be used with any transport mechanism that 
employs MIME protocols, such as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).  
 
5.2  Security and Compliance Issues 
S/MIME products can be implemented with different combinations of security features 
and a variety of cryptographic algorithms.  Senders and receivers may have different 
capabilities and may be sending messages protected with algorithms of different 
strengths.  This can lead to numerous interoperability issues.  Federal clients using secure 
email shall be able to perform the following:  
 
•  Send and receive signed messages, 
•  Send and receive encrypted messages, 
•  Send and receive signed and encrypted messages, 
                                                 
33 RFC 3851 is currently under revision.  See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-11. 
  52•  Request, send and process signed receipts, and 
•  Process messages from secure email list clients (includes suppressing receipts, as 
required, and nondisclosure of list recipients, as required). 
 
Furthermore, Federal systems shall: 
•  Utilize cryptographic modules that are FIPS 140-1 or FIPS 140-2 certified, 
•  Support cryptographic suites ALS 1 and ALS 2 (see Tables 5-1 and 5-2 below), 
and 
•  Require X.509 certificates that conform to Federal PKI X.509 Certificates and the 
CRL Extensions Profile. 
 
Federal clients should be capable of sending and processing email with security labels 
and securely binding senders’ certificates to their signatures through the signing 
certificate attribute as described in RFC 5035 [RFC 5035].
34  
 
The most widely accepted, standard S/MIME profile is [RFC 3851]
35.  Not all 
cryptographic algorithms available for use in support of these features are appropriate for 
the protection of Federal government information.  The S/MIME specifications allow the 
selection of individual algorithms. However, a number of cipher suites have been 
specified to define a specific combination of algorithms. Federal organizations shall use 
approved algorithms within S/MIME implementations for key establishment and 
transmitting messages.  Tables 5.1 through 5.7 specify a variety of cipher suites that may 
be used to protect Federal information and information systems ([SP 800-49], [RFC 
5008]).  Any of the algorithms listed in the following tables may be used, in accordance 
with security strength time frame restrictions given in Part 1, to protect Federal 
information in combinations other than those displayed. 
 
Table 5-1: Cipher Suite 1 (ALS1) 
Mechanism  Guidance 
Digital 
Signatures 
RSA with key sizes ≥ 1024 bits 
[FIPS 186-3] and [RFC 3447] 
Hash SHA-1 
[FIPS 180-3] 
Key Transport  RSA with key sizes ≥ 1024 bits 
[RFC 3447] and [SP 800-56B] 
Encryption  TDEA in CBC mode 
[RFC 3851] and [SP 800-67] 
 
                                                 
34 Both of these services are defined in S/MIME V3 standards RFC 2634 [RFC 2634]. 
35 RFC 3851 is currently under revision.  See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-11. 
 
  53Table 5-2: Cipher Suite 2 (ALS2) 
Mechanism  Guidance 
Digital 
Signatures 
DSA with; key sizes ≥ 1024 bits 
[FIPS186-3] 
Hash SHA-1 
[FIPS 180-3] 
Key Transport  RSA with key sizes ≥ 1024 bits 
[RFC 3447] and [SP 800-56B]
  
Encryption  TDEA in CBC mode 
[RFC 3851] and [SP 800-67] 
 
 
Table 5-3: Cipher Suite 3 (ALS3) 
Mechanism  Guidance 
Digital 
Signatures 
RSA with keys ≥ 1024 bits 
[FIPS 186-3] and [RFC 3447] 
Hash SHA-1 
[FIPS 180-3] 
Key Transport  RSA with key sizes ≥ 1024 bits 
[RFC 3447] and [SP 800-56B] 
Encryption  AES-128 in CBC mode 
[FIPS 197] and [SP 800-38A] 
 
Table 5-4: Cipher Suite 4 (ALS4) 
Mechanism  Guidance 
Digital 
Signatures 
DSA with key sizes ≥ 1024bits 
[FIPS186-3] 
Hash SHA-1 
[FIPS 180-3] 
Key 
Agreement 
Diffie-Hellman 
[RFC 2631] and [SP 800-56A] 
Encryption  TDEA  in CBC mode 
[RFC 3851], [SP 800-38A] and [SP 800-67] 
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Mechanism  Guidance 
Digital 
Signatures 
DSA with key sizes ≥ 1024 bits 
[FIPS 186-3] 
Hash SHA-256 
[FIPS 180-3] 
Key 
Agreement 
Diffie-Hellman 
[RFC 2631] and [SP 800-56A] 
Encryption  AES in CBC mode  
[FIPS 197] and [SP 800-38A] 
 
Table 5-6: Cipher Suite B, Level 1* 
Mechanism  Guidance 
Digital 
Signatures 
ECDSA with P-256 
[X9.62] 
Hash SHA-256 
[FIPS 180-3] 
Key 
Agreement 
ECDH with P-256 
[SEC1] 
Key 
Derivation 
Based on SHA-256 
[SEC1] 
Key Wrap  AES-128 
[RFC 3394] 
Encryption  AES-128 in CBC mode 
[FIPS 197] and [SP 800-38A] 
*see [RFC 5008] 
 
Table 5-7: Cipher Suite B, Level 2* 
Mechanism  Guidance 
Digital 
Signatures 
ECDSA with P-384 
[X9.62] 
Hash SHA-384 
[FIPS 180-3] 
Key 
Agreement 
ECDH with P-384 
[SEC1] 
Key 
Derivation 
Based on SHA-384 
[SEC1] 
Key Wrap  AES-256 
[RFC 3394] 
Encryption  AES-256 in CBC mode 
[FIPS 197] and [SP 800-38A] 
* see [RFC 5008] 
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signatures.  Also, at that time, algorithm and key size requirements may also change.  
(See SP 800-57 Part 1.)  
 
Federal clients shall be supported by a Public Key Infrastructure with valid Federal PKI 
X.509 certificates for senders and receivers.   
 
Cryptographic modules used in Federal systems shall comply with FIPS 140-2. 
 
Federal S/MIME implementations may, in accordance with organizational policies, be 
capable of receiving messages protected with algorithm suites that are not approved for 
Federal use in sending protected messages.  In those instances, users should be presented 
with a warning banner explaining that the cryptographic mechanisms used are weak and, 
therefore, integrity and authentication cannot be assured.   
 
5.3   Procurement Guidance 
The following recommendations are for any individual that makes a purchasing decision 
for acquiring an S/MIME-enabled component.   
 
1.  In support of security and compatibility across the Federal government, all 
Federal information systems shall support ALS 1 and ALS 2. 
 
2.  Procurement officials should buy products that support hash algorithms that 
provide more protection for digital signatures than SHA-1, such as ALS 5, Cipher 
Suite B level 1 and Cipher Suite B level 2 (see FIPS 180-3 [FIPS 180-3]).    
 
3.  Federal clients should support MD5 and RC2 in the event that users receive 
correspondence signed or encrypted with these weaker, unapproved algorithms.   
 
4.  Federal agencies shall not use SHA-1 for digital signatures after 2010.  Therefore, 
when selecting a product with S/MIME functionality, procurement officials 
should consider organizational needs for cryptography beyond 2010 and 
purchase for the future.  Cryptographic algorithm implementations should be 
modular so as to allow for new algorithms. 
 
5.  If an S/MIME client needs to generate a key pair, then the S/MIME client or some 
related administrative utility or function shall be capable of generating public 
private key pairs on behalf of the user.  
 
5.4  Recommendations for System Installers 
The system installer is the individual that installs the S/MIME application and performs 
the initial configuration of the system.  
 
1.  Federal clients shall be configured to support cipher suites ALS1 and ALS2 for 
interoperability as described above in Section 5.2.   
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2.  In accordance with security requirements beyond 2010, Federal clients shall be 
configured to support cipher suites with algorithms and key size requirements as 
described in SP 800-57, Part 1. 
 
3.  Systems shall be configured so that they only permit the use of approved 
cryptographic algorithms and approved key sizes to encrypt or sign new 
messages.   
 
4.  Installers should install and configure S/MIME clients such that they default to 
the use of an approved cipher algorithm suite.  Furthermore, installers should 
configure clients such that there is a straightforward means for end users to 
change default settings and select algorithms as needed for interoperability and in 
accordance with organizational needs and policies.   
 
5.  System installers should configure clients such that end users can use unique 
certificates for each security function (e.g., encryption, digital signatures) at their 
disposal. 
 
5.5  Recommendations for System Administrators 
The System Administrator is the individual who runs the S/MIME application on a day-
to-day basis and, on client implementations, interacts with the end user. 
 
1.  The system administrator shall ensure that end users are properly trained and that 
the organization’s security policy is enforced. 
 
2.  In accordance with security requirements beyond 2010, Federal clients shall be 
maintained to support cipher suites with algorithms and key size requirements as 
described in SP 800-57 Part 1. 
 
3.  Systems shall be maintained so that they only permit the use of approved 
cryptographic algorithms and approved key sizes to encrypt or sign new 
messages.   
 
4.  Administrators should maintain S/MIME clients such that they default to the use 
of an approved cipher algorithm suite.  Furthermore, administrators should 
maintain a straightforward means for end users to change default settings and 
select algorithms as needed for interoperability and in accordance with 
organizational needs and policies.   
 
5.  System administrators should provide training for users on the relative security 
provided by various cryptographic algorithms and on organizational policies for 
their use. 
 
  576.  System administrators should provide end users with guidance on how 
certificates and keys are stored and managed, and identify the end user’s related 
responsibilities. 
 
5.6  Recommendations for End Users 
An end user is the individual using a client to access the system.  Even within a centrally 
managed environment, end users may find that they have a significant amount of control 
over some of the security features within an SMIME implementation. 
 
1.  Users shall operate their system as instructed by their organization and system 
administrators. 
 
2.  Users should use unique certificates for each security function at their disposal.
36   
 
3.  Users shall protect their private keys from unauthorized disclosure. 
 
4.  Users should not send the same message both encrypted and in plain text. 
 
 
                                                 
36 If they have not been supplied with certificates by their home organizations, users can obtain certificates 
from a number of organizations via the web.   
  586  Kerberos 
6.1  Description 
The Kerberos authentication mechanism was developed at MIT to enable the secure 
authentication of users to Target Servers (TSs) over an unprotected network, where client 
software acts on behalf of a user
37.  The original design and implementation of Kerberos 
and its first three revisions (i.e., versions 1 through 4) was primarily the work of Steve 
Miller, Clifford Neuman, Jerome Saltzer and Jeffrey Schiller
38.  Kerberos is used for 
local logins, remote (over the network) authentication, and for client-to-TS requests. It 
can also be extended to provide for the establishment of cryptographic keys between a 
client and a TS. Kerberos has been designed so that a user and a TS rely on a trusted third 
party to provide assurance of each party’s identity. This assurance is granted by means of 
tickets and authentication information, each encrypted with symmetric keys.  
 
The trusted third party is a Key Distribution Center (KDC), which consists of an 
Authentication Server (AS) and a Ticket Granting Service (TGS).  The AS and TGS may 
or may not reside on the same machine.  The KDC has a database of user, TS, and TGS 
symmetric keys.  All KDC symmetric keys are accessible by the TGS. The user’s key is 
normally created by hashing a user’s password with other information.   
 
An overview of the Kerberos version 5 protocol is shown in Figure 6-1. The following is 
a simplification of the process (e.g., the generation of most keys and the use of most 
cryptographic operations are not specified). For example, tickets and authentication 
information are protected with checksums and encryption when transmitted.    
1.  A user logs onto a client by entering a password, from which a user symmetric 
key is generated. 
2.  The client, acting on behalf of the user, requests a Ticket Granting Ticket from the 
AS. 
3.  The AS generates a Ticket Granting Ticket, for a specified validity period, and 
sends it to the client.  
4.  The client provides the Ticket Granting Ticket to the TGS, along with his own 
authentication information, which includes the client identifier and a time stamp. 
5.  The TGS checks the authentication information and the validity period of the 
Ticket Granting Ticket. The TGS then generates a Target Server Ticket and sends 
it to the client.  
6.  The client sends authentication information and the Target Server Ticket to the 
TS.  
                                                 
37 Note that a single client implementation may be used by multiple users, and a single user may use 
multiple client implementations (e.g., a user could access different workstations, each with its own client 
implementation).  
38 The design was based in part upon a protocol proposed by Needham and Schroeder [NEED] with 
modifications provided by Denning and Sacco [DENN]. For more detail on the goals, motivations, and 
rationale of Kerberos see [NEUM]. 
  597.  The TS checks the authentication information and the validity period of the Target 
Server Ticket; if the information is reasonable, the user is authenticated to the TS. 
 
The protocol may be extended to authenticate the TS to the user, and a ticket may be re-
used within its validity period. 
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Figure 6-1: The Kerberos Protocol 
 
Each TGS has its own “realm” of clients and TSs.  However, different realms may be 
linked by the sharing of inter-realm keys between TGS's (see Figure 6-2). A client in 
Realm 1 wishing a service on a TS in Realm 2 may obtain a ticket from TGS1 that 
introduces the client to TGS2. This ticket is encrypted with the inter-realm key shared 
between TGS1 and TGS2.  The client can then request a ticket from TGS2 for the desired 
service on the TS in Realm 2. Thus, realms may be networked to provide clients with 
inter-realm services.  
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Figure 6-2: Cross-Realm Authentication 
 
In an alternative Kerberos protocol between the client and the AS (as specified in RFC 
4556 [RFC 4556]), either both the user and the AS have key establishment public key 
pairs with corresponding certificates, or the user has a key establishment key pair and 
associated certificate, and the AS has a digital signature key pair and digital signature 
certificate. The user symmetric key can then be established between the client and the 
KDC in one of two ways: 
1.  using key agreement (e.g., Diffie-Hellman) between the AS and the client
39, or 
2.  using key transport (e.g., RSA), where the AS generates the user symmetric key, 
and sends the key to the client
40. 
Once the user symmetric key is established, the remainder of the protocol proceeds as 
previously described.  The need for user symmetric keys generated from passwords can 
thus be avoided.  
 
6.2  Security and Compliance Issues 
1.  Kerberos version 5 was initially specified in RFC 1510 [RFC 1510].  More 
recently, the security was updated in version 5; see RFC 4120 [RFC 4120]; 
however, many existing implementations still correspond to the initial RFC. 
                                                 
39 In this case, both the user and the AS have key establishment key pairs.  
40 In this case, the user has a key establishment key pair, and the AS has a digital signature key pair. 
  612.  Many current Kerberos implementations based on RFC 1510 rely on DES for 
symmetric encryption functions. DES is no longer approved for use in protecting 
Federal government information.  
3.  If a keyless checksum computation is used for the data integrity of Kerberos 
messages, the integrity of the message may be inadequate. 
4.  Some Kerberos implementations rely solely on the entropy (i.e., randomness) 
provided by the user password to generate the symmetric client key (the client key 
is a hash of the user’s password). Passwords, in general, do not provide enough 
randomness for generating a key.  In such cases, a dictionary attack
41 is feasible. 
If passwords are used to generate cryptographic keys, they should be selected to 
maximize the difficulty of a password guessing attack, thus increasing the 
difficulty of an off-line dictionary attack; see SP 800-118 [SP 800-118].
42 
5.  Compromising the client, KDC, or TS could compromise the symmetric keys that 
they contain and thereby compromise parts of the system. In particular, the KDC 
stores keying information for all the KDC users, the TGS, and any TS that 
communicates directly with the KDC TGS. These symmetric keys require 
protection that is commensurate with the protection required for the data that they 
protect (e.g., tickets, other keys, authentication information, and shared data).  
6.  The TGS has read-only access to the KDC database. If the TGS and database do 
not reside on the same machine, a secure channel is required for the TGS to obtain 
the required TS keys.  
7.  A failure of the AS or the TGS would prevent all AS users from obtaining new 
tickets and corresponding new services. 
8.  Clocks must be synchronized in order to accurately assess the validity of clock 
authentication information and tickets.  If the TS is running late, then previous 
authentication information and tickets could be played back to the TS after they 
have expired. 
 
 
6.3  Procurement Guidance 
The following recommendations are for any individual that makes a purchasing decision 
for acquiring a Kerberos capability.   
 
1.  New procurements shall conform to version 5; see RFC 4120.  
                                                 
41 A dictionary attack is a technique for guessing a password by selecting candidate passwords from a list 
of words commonly found in a dictionary, or derived from words commonly found in a dictionary. Each 
selected candidate is tested as though it were the actual password until the result of the test indicates that 
the correct password has been selected. 
42 SP 800-118 Guide to Enterprise Password Management is currently under development.  The current 
draft can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html. 
  622.  Government procurements shall specify the inclusion of approved symmetric key 
encryption algorithms (e.g., the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)) RFC 3962 
[RFC 3962].  
3.  An approved MAC computation (e.g., HMAC-SHA1) shall be available for data 
integrity with encryption (see RFC 3962).   
4.  Kerberos version 5 permits the use of smart cards or tokens (e.g., FIPS 201 
Personal Identity Verification cards, [FIPS 201]) to store a user's password. 
Passwords stored on tokens shall be randomly generated; therefore, when tokens 
are used, a means of generating random passwords and securely writing them on 
the token shall be available. When tokens are used, manual entry of passwords 
shall not be permitted except to authenticate the user to the token. 
5.  If passwords are used to form user symmetric keys, then the password mechanism 
shall support the use of strong passwords; see SP 800-118,
42 and an approved 
hash algorithm (e.g., SHA-1 or stronger) shall be used as the hash algorithm. 
6.  If passwords are generated by users, then the system software shall enforce a 
strong password policy in accordance with SP 800-118.
42 
7.  Kerberos with public key authentication and subsequent key establishment can 
provide stronger security than the use of password-based keys and should be 
available where PKI mechanisms are available. See RFC 4556 for further 
information. 
8.  Procurement officials should consider whether inter-realm networking is 
necessary and include the capability in the software if it’s needed. 
9.  Cryptographic modules used by CAs, TSs and clients shall be validated at FIPS 
140-2 Level 1 or higher. 
 
6.4  Recommendations for System Installers 
The system installer is any individual(s) that installs a Kerberos capability and performs 
the initial configuration of the system. 
 
1.  New systems shall conform to version 5; see RFC 4120. 
2.  Government systems shall be configured so that approved algorithms (e.g., AES) 
shall be used (see RFC 3962), and DES shall not be used. 
3.  An approved MAC checksum (e.g., HMAC-SHA1) shall be installed and used in 
all implementations for data integrity purposes; see RFC 3962. 
4.  The AS, TGS, TSs, and clients shall use strong access control mechanisms
43 
(physical and logical) for protecting and updating keys. 
                                                 
43 Strong access control mechanisms either prevent or detect unauthorized attempts to access or replace 
sensitive data. These controls may be physical (e.g., locks, guards, or alarms) or logical (e.g., encryption, 
data integrity, or entity authentication). 
  635.  Kerberos version 5 permits the use of smart cards or tokens (e.g., FIPS 
201 Personal Identity Verification cards) to store a user's password. 
Passwords stored on tokens shall be randomly generated; therefore, when 
tokens are used, a means of generating random passwords and securely 
writing them on the token shall be used. When tokens are used, 
manual entry of passwords shall not be permitted except to authenticate 
the user to the token.   
6.  Kerberos with public key-based user authentication and key establishment can 
provide stronger security than password-based keys and should be installed where 
PKI mechanisms are available and the software has the capability. See RFC 4556 
for further information. 
7.  If user passwords are generated by the system, the system shall generate strong 
passwords; see SP 800-118.
42 
8.  If passwords are used to form user symmetric keys, then an approved hash 
algorithm (e.g., SHA-1 or stronger) shall be used as the password hashing 
algorithm. 
9.  If user passwords are used to generate cryptographic keys, the password 
mechanism shall be configured to use and require strong passwords; see SP 800-
118.
42  
10. A backup AS and TGS should be provided so as to minimize the impact in case 
of operational failure or denial-of-service attacks. 
11. Clocks should be synchronized periodically and whenever a new system is 
brought on-line
44. 
 
6.5  Recommendations for System Administrators 
The System Administrator is any individual(s) who runs a system with a Kerberos 
capability on a day-to-day basis and interacts with the end user. 
 
1.  System administrators shall ensure that users are properly trained and that the 
organization’s security policy is enforced. 
2.  The AS, TGS, TS, and client shall be physically secured. 
3.  Tickets shall be encrypted or physically protected at the client, TS, and TGS sites. 
4.  If the passwords are generated by the user, then the system administrator shall 
develop a policy for selecting strong passwords that is enforced by the software; 
see SP 800-118.
42  
5.  System clocks shall be periodically verified to ensure synchronization. 
 
                                                 
44 (see http://www.nist.time.gov). 
  646.6  Recommendations for End Users 
An end user is the individual using the Kerberos capability. 
 
1.  If user-selected passwords are allowed, they shall be generated in accordance 
with the organization’s password policy. 
2.  Users shall protect their password from unauthorized disclosure. If a token 
containing a password or key is provided, users shall protect the token from 
unauthorized use. Users shall report the loss of physical tokens or the 
compromise of passwords. 
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7  Over-The-Air Rekeying (OTAR) Key Management Messages 
(KMMs) 
7.1  Description 
A key management protocol has been specified for over-the-air rekeying of digital radios 
(OTAR) [OTAR]. This protocol has been designed to handle several types of 
cryptographic security, one of which, Type 3, has been designed for unclassified, 
sensitive communications and is discussed herein. The only differences between the 
security types are the cryptographic algorithms used and the security requirements. The 
Type 3 algorithms and security requirements are addressed in both OTAR and OTAR1 
[OTAR1]
45. 
 
For key management, a secure mobile system consists of Key Management Facilities 
(KMFs) and mobile radios that are subordinate to each KMF. Key Management 
Messages (KMMs) are exchanged between each KMF and its subordinate mobile radios 
(see Figure 7-1). Cryptographic keys are transferred from a KMF to a mobile radio, 
protected using a key-wrapping algorithm and key wrapping key; many of the KMMs are 
protected by encrypting the data in the messages; the integrity of the messages is 
protected using a Message Authentication Code (MAC).  
 
Key Management
Facility
O O O O O O O O
Mobile Radio Mobile Radio
KMMs
O O O O Portable Radio
: Normal radio communications (i.e., no KMMs)  
Figure 7-1: Radio Communications with OTAR  
                                                 
45 [OTAR] provides an overview of the key management techniques and the protocol. [OTAR1] specifies 
the general security requirements for transmitting Type 3 key management messages (KMMs), the 
requirements for wrapping the keys, the techniques used for KMM integrity and the mechanism used to 
protect against replay of the KMMs. 
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Three general types of keys are used in OTAR: a Key-Wrapping Key (KWK)
46, a 
Traffic-Encryption Key (TEK) and a key to be used for the computation of a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC). 
 
7.2  Security and Compliance Issues 
7.2.1  Cryptographic Algorithms 
Although the protocol has been designed to allow the use of any block cipher algorithm 
to apply the cryptographic protection, only three block cipher algorithms have been 
included in the specification: DES, TDEA and AES. 
 
Approval for DES has been withdrawn because DES no longer provides the security that 
is needed to protect Federal government information. 
 
TDEA, as specified in SP 800-67, uses three DES encryption/decryption operations with 
a “key bundle” consisting of three separate DES keys. Two versions of TDEA have been 
included in the OTAR specification: a one-key version, whereby all three keys are the 
same for compatibility with DES, and a three-key version (3-TDEA), whereby the three 
keys are different. Since DES is no longer considered secure, the one-key version of the 
TDEA is also no longer considered secure. 
 
7.2.2  Message Authentication and Cryptoperiods 
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used to authenticate and protect the integrity 
of many of the KMMs as specified in OTAR1, using the CBC-MAC mode of operation. 
The security of a MAC depends, in part, on the block size of the MAC algorithm. AES 
has a larger block size than 3-TDEA, and so the security of AES CBC-MAC is better 
than 3-TDEA CBC-MAC. The OTAR documentation provides no guidance on the length 
of cryptoperiods (i.e., the number of messages or the length of time that a key may be 
used before it must be changed). 
 
For AES, the number of messages that can be authenticated using a given key is, in 
practice, not an issue. However, AES keys shall be periodically updated because of other 
threats to the system, e.g., lost radios or an undetected compromise of a key. 
 
When using 3-TDEA, no more than 1,000,000 messages shall be sent using a given key 
because of threats to the security of the algorithm. However, like AES, it may be prudent 
to update the 3-TDEA keys more frequently because of other threats to the system.  
 
                                                 
46 A Key Wrapping Key may also be referred to as a Key Encryption Key (KEK). 
  677.2.3  Key Usage 
Part 1 of this Recommendation states that keys should be used for only one purpose.
47 
However, OTAR1 states that the key used to generate a MAC must be either a key 
reserved for authentication and integrity protection purposes, or a key derived from a 
Traffic-Encryption Key (TEK) using a key wrapping algorithm. In this latter case, note 
that the TEK might be used for both encryption and for key derivation. In order to 
comply with the recommendation to use a key for only one purpose, the MAC key 
should be a key reserved for a single purpose. 
 
7.2.4  Backup 
The KMF should backup all keying material shared with and among the mobile radios so 
that it can be recovered if necessary. When a key is no longer required, it should be 
deleted from both normal operational storage and backup storage. 
 
7.2.5  Rekeying 
Procedures shall be in place to rekey all radios in the network in the event of a key 
compromise. If a radio is lost, procedures shall enable rekeying other radios in the 
network so that the lost radio no longer has the capability of communicating securely 
with other radios in the network. 
 
7.2.6  Random bit generators 
Keys shall be generated at the KMF using an approved random bit generator that 
provides sufficient randomness for the desired security strength of the cryptographic 
processes; see SP 800-90. 
 
7.3  Procurement Guidance 
The following recommendations are for any individual(s) that makes a purchasing 
decision for acquiring OTAR equipment.  
 
1. Procurements  shall include the AES or TDEA algorithm. 
 
2.  If TDEA is provided in an implementation, the three-key version shall be included. 
 
3.  Procurements that include TDEA shall be capable of limiting the number of uses of a 
single TDEA key bundle to 1,000,000.
48 
 
4.  KMFs and radios shall conform to OTAR and OTAR1. 
 
                                                 
47 There is an allowed exception to this rule, but it does not apply to OTAR (see Section 5.2 in Part 1). 
48 See Section 7.2.2. 
  685.  When keys are generated within KMFs, they shall be generated using approved 
random bit generators. 
 
6.  Cryptographic modules used by the KMF and the mobile radios shall be validated at 
FIPS 140-2 Level 1 or higher. 
 
7. KMFs  shall include backup and archive capabilities to support reconstitution of the 
KMF in the event of a disaster (e.g., fire, earthquake).   
 
7.4  Recommendations for System Installers 
The system installer is the individual(s) that installs an OTAR capability and performs 
the initial configuration of the system components. 
 
1. The  KMF  shall use and have strong physical and logical access control mechanisms 
to protect the cryptographic keys (e.g., physical locks, alarms or password token). 
 
2. Backup  KMFs  should be provided, along with a strategy and procedures to transition 
from a primary KMF to a backup KMF, and from a backup KMF to the primary 
KMF. 
 
3. A  TEK  should not be used for multiple purposes. Reserved MAC keys should be 
used for message authentication and integrity protection. 
 
4.  Maximum cryptoperiods for each key type shall be determined at the KMF in 
accordance with the organization’s security policy and Section 7.2.2.  
 
5. Radios  shall be accounted for; in the case of a lost or stolen radio, an assessment of 
the effect of a loss of the keys contained in that radio shall be made. The use of any 
key contained in that radio shall be discontinued. Procedures shall be in place for 
replacing these keys if used by the KMF or by other radios.  
 
6. Implementations  shall be configured to use the AES or TDEA algorithms, and to 
disallow the use of DES. 
 
7.  If TDEA is provided and is to be used, the three-key version shall be used, and the 
one-key version shall not be used. 
 
8.  For implementations using TDEA in which the cryptoperiod of a key bundle is 
configurable, the cryptoperiod shall be set to a value less than 1,000,000 messages. 
 
7.5  Recommendations for System Administrators 
The System Administrator is the individual who manages the OTAR system or its 
components on a day-to-day basis and interacts with the end users. 
 
1. System  administrators  shall ensure that the organization’s security policy is enforced. 
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2. System  administrators  shall protect the keying material from disclosure and 
modification. 
 
3. Procedures  shall be in place for replacing keys at the end of their cryptoperiod. 
 
4.  To maintain the availability of the KMF, system administrators shall ensure that 
sufficient information is stored in a secure location to reconstitute the KMF after a 
disaster. 
 
5. System  administrators  shall train end users in the use of their radios and the 
procedures to be followed in the case of lost radios or suspected key compromises. 
 
6. Audit  logs  should be maintained at the KMF with sufficient information to indicate 
which keys are shared by which radios.   
  
7.6  Recommendations for End Users 
An end user is the individual using a radio that has an OTAR capability. 
 
1. End  Users  shall operate radios as instructed by their organization and system 
administrators. 
 
2. End  users  shall protect their radios from loss and unauthorized access. 
 
3.  In the event that a radio is lost or a key is suspected of being compromised, end users 
shall immediately notify the system administrator in accordance with the 
organization’s security policy. 
 
  708  Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)  
8.1  Description 
Domain Name System (DNS), as defined in [RFC 1034] and [RFC 1035], is the global 
hierarchical distributed database system for mapping Internet addresses, SMTP servers, 
and other information to a human readable name. Its main purpose is handling mappings 
between host domain names and Internet addresses, but it can handle other forms of data 
as well, such as host system information, geographic-location of servers, even encoded 
digital certificates.  DNS data is stored as individual Resource Records (RR) that 
associates a piece of data (e.g., IP address, mail server name) with a domain name and an 
identifying Resource Record type code (RR type). All the RRs for a particular 
organization are stored in an administrative unit called a zone.  Multiple zones form a 
domain.  A domain is hierarchical, in that one zone may act as a delegating parent to one 
or more child delegated zones.  For example, most Federal agencies are child delegations 
under the “.gov” parent zone.   
 
Zone information is maintained on authoritative servers, which are distributed all over 
the Internet to answer queries according to the DNS network protocols.  The DNS 
infrastructure is comprised of a small group (or single server) known as a primary master 
authoritative server that has a local zone database, and multiple secondary servers that 
obtain their copies of the zone database from the primary authoritative master server.  
Another set of components are caching recursive servers
49, which query the authoritative 
servers and cache any replies. On the end user’s client system, software components 
known as resolvers make DNS queries to recursive caches and/or authoritative servers.  
Figure 8-1 depicts the relationship between the DNS components. 
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Figure 8-1: DNS Components 
 
The basic DNS does not have many security features; see SP 800-81 [SP 800-81].  A 
suite of RFCs has been developed to provide security enhancements contained in three 
                                                 
49 Caching Recursive Server is sometimes shortened to “caching server” or “recursive server”.  However, 
the role remains the same. 
  71IETF documents, collectively called the DNS security extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC 4033, 
RFC 4034, and RFC 4035].  DNSSEC provides a layer of authentication and integrity 
protection for any kind of data stored in the DNS, including data used by other protocols.  
For example, there are RR types allocated for storing Secure Shell (SSH) keys in the 
DNS, which then rely on DNSSEC to protect the integrity of that information. 
 
8.1.1  DNS Data Authentication 
Cryptographically generated public key-based digital signatures provide authentication 
for DNS data.  Commonly, there will be two or more digital signature public key pairs 
(which make up the key set) used to implement DNSSEC in a zone.  One key pair is used 
to sign the zone data (referred to as the Zone Signing Key or ZSK), and a separate key 
pair is used to sign the zone key set (known as the Key Signing Key or KSK).  This KSK 
is also known as the Secure Entry Point (SEP) key for the zone – using it, a client can 
authenticate the ZSK (by validating the signature over the ZSK using the KSK public 
key), and then use the ZSK to authenticate the zone data.  The KSK is also used to link 
the security chain
50 from the zone to its delegating parent.  Since the KSK is used to link 
security from the zone (e.g. “example.gov”) to the delegating parent zone (e.g. “.gov”) 
[RFC 4035], it is often longer lived, and used infrequently (used only to sign the zone key 
set).  Multiple digital signature algorithms can be supported, so there may be multiple 
keys (one for each algorithm), as there is no algorithm negotiation in DNSSEC, and 
clients may only understand certain digital signature algorithms.  There is one 
mandatory-to-implement algorithm as defined by the IETF, so there is at least one 
agreed-upon digital signature algorithm that all servers and clients will understand. 
 
When this document was published, the only mandatory-to-implement algorithm to use 
with DNSSEC data authentication is RSA using SHA-1 as a hash algorithm.
51  When the 
use of SHA-256 (or greater) is included in the specification, there shall be an immediate 
transition plan to migrate from the use of RSA with SHA-1 to the use of RSA with SHA-
256 (see FIPS 180-3) for DNS data authentication.  However, both hash algorithms (i.e., 
SHA-1 and SHA-256) should be used to generate digital signatures for DNS data for a 
period of time to ensure that client systems that cannot validate RSA with SHA-256 can 
still authenticate DNS data. The length of this transition period depends on the 
widespread availability and deployment of client system software that understands RSA 
with SHA-256. 
 
8.1.2  DNS Transaction Authentication 
Additional authentication mechanisms are used for server-server communication and 
administrative control.  Transaction authentication is performed by computing an HMAC 
                                                 
50 The security chain (also referred to as “chain of authentication”) is the collection of digital signatures and 
public keys that can be used to trace a logical path from the data to be validated back to a trusted, installed 
public key on the client, see SP 800-81.  This chain of public keys and signatures is similar to a PKI 
certificate chain (see Section 2.1), but entirely contained within the DNS.  
51 Note that the transition away from SHA-1 in 2011 is necessary when the hash function is used for digital 
signatures, but not when used for HMAC. 
  72over the entire DNS message and a secret random string that is known by both 
authoritative DNS servers in the transaction, and transmitting the result in a Transaction 
Signature (TSIG) RR appended to the original message.  Transaction authentication is 
usually used for special transactions, such as zone transfers or dynamic updates.  A zone 
transfer is a special query type that is used to keep secondary authoritative servers up-to-
date with the most recent version of the zone data.  Dynamic update is a feature that 
allows an authorized administrator to add or delete DNS data by sending a specially 
formatted message.   This is frequently used in local area networks where the Dynamic 
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is used to assign IP addresses dynamically. The 
DHCP server may update the DNS server by sending a dynamic update message to 
reflect network changes.   
 
The currently defined algorithm used in TSIG authentication is HMAC using SHA-1.  
This is deemed acceptable for current security practices when using HMAC with a 
suitably random secret string; see SP 800-90.  Newer implementations allow for stronger 
hash algorithms to be used (SHA-256 and stronger) and may be used when available. All 
DNS server administrators taking part in the transaction must agree on which algorithm 
and secret string size will be used for transaction authentication and must ensure that all 
parties have the same secret random string (which may include out-of-band transactions 
to distribute keys). 
 
8.1.3   DNS Cryptographic Algorithms/Schemes, Modes and Combinations 
DNS does not support algorithms in isolation, but specifies suites of algorithms and 
schemes. Algorithm/scheme combinations for zone data signing and for message 
authentication are provided in Tables 8-1 and 8-2: 
 
Table 8-1: Recommended Algorithm and Scheme Combinations for Zone Data 
Signing 
Suite  Authentication  Digest  IETF 
Status 
Approved for 
Federal Use
52 
RSA_SHA1 RSA  SHA-1  Mandatory  YES 
DSA_SHA1 DSA  SHA-1  Optional  YES   
RSA_SHA256 RSA  SHA-256  Optional  YES 
RSA_SHA512 RSA  SHA-512  Optional  YES 
 
                                                 
52 Refer to Part 1 of this guide for approved key lengths and for algorithm lifetimes. 
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Suite  IETF status  Approved for 
Federal Use 
HMAC_SHA1 Mandatory  YES 
HMAC_SHA256 Optional  YES 
GSS_TSIG
53 Optional  YES 
 
It should be noted that HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT is a suite that is widely 
implemented and often set as the default choice.  However, it shall not be used for 
Federal implementations. Since TSIG message authentication is used between servers 
where there is an existing trust relationship, the administrators must agree to the method 
used and the secret (random) string used with the TSIG method. 
 
Currently, there are plans for migrating to SHA-256 and SHA-512 by the IETF 
community for use with RSA in zone data signing. The registry maintained by the 
Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) function for DNSSEC algorithm codes has 
several entries available for use, but the use of SHA-256 has yet to be finalized and 
implemented in current software.  However, the use of SHA-256 is encouraged and 
should be considered when supported by DNSSEC software.  There should be a 
transition period when SHA-1 and SHA-256 would both be used to ensure that clients 
that are non-SHA-256-aware could still validate signatures until they are upgraded. 
 
Due to message size constraints (See Section 8.1.4 below), large RSA keys may result in 
DNS transaction failures that are often interpreted by clients as DNS failures. It is 
recommended to move to a digital signature algorithm that has the same level of security 
with smaller sized keys, such as ECDSA or similar. As of the time of writing this 
document, there is some progress in the IETF to provide ECC support to DNSSEC, but it 
is not finalized.  It is recommended that DNS administrators plan to migrate to ECDSA 
for zone signing by Oct 1
st 2015 or plan to migrate earlier as soon as it becomes available 
in DNS software components. 
 
8.1.4  Special Considerations for Key Sizes 
There are some special considerations needed when choosing the size of the RSA 
DNSSEC signing keys. Early deployments have shown that large RSA keys can result in 
other protocol issues, such as response messages that are too large to fit in a standard 
UDP packet. DNSSEC requires the use of larger DNS packet sizes up to 4KB, but 
practical limits are around 1500 bytes or less.   
 
It is recommended that DNS administrators maintain 1024 bit RSA/SHA-1 and/or 
RSA/SHA-256 ZSK’s until Oct 1
st 2015, or until it is proven that the majority of routers, 
caches and other network middleboxes can handle packet sizes over 1500 bytes (if before 
2015).   However, 1024-bit RSA keys are allowed until the 2015 date to accommodate 
                                                 
53 Generic Security Service Algorithm for Secret Key Transaction Authentication (GSS-TSIG [RFC3645]) 
may be found in some server implementations 
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UDP packets with sizes over 1500 bytes. This exception on RSA key sizes does not apply 
to Key Signing Keys.  KSK’s shall follow the guidance set in Part 1 of this guide. 
 
It is recommended that zone administrators migrate DNSSEC zone signing algorithms to 
ECDSA (or similar) by 2015 or when support for ECDSA appears in DNSSEC 
components, whichever is sooner. 
 
To minimize the risk when using 1024 bit RSA ZSK’s with DNSSEC, ZSK’s should be 
changed more frequently:  every 1-3 months, with a signature validity period of 5-7 days.  
The ZSK rollover sequence discussed in the NIST Special Publication 800-81 [SP 800-
81] is recommended to maintain a valid chain of authentication in DNS data. 
8.1.5  Special Considerations for NSEC3 
There is a special varient to DNSSEC that minimizes the risk of information leakage and 
is known as the Hashed Next Secure (NSEC3) RR; see RFC 5155 [RFC 5155].  In 
DNSSEC, a client can map the contents of the zone by sending a series of queries for the 
Next Secure (NSEC) RR type found in error messages.  These NSEC RRs provide signed 
proof that the queried name did not exist, but also provides two names that do exist in the 
zone as part of that proof. NSEC3 attempts to minimize this information leakage of zone 
names by using the hash values of the two existing names (currently using SHA-1 only).  
However, this requires the server and client to be able to perform multiple SHA-1 hash 
calculations during runtime; note that this method could be used to mount a Denial of 
Service attack against the server if multiple requests are made.   
NSEC3 was designed to solve a specific class of information leakage that could lead to a 
complete mapping of network resources in a DNS zone.  NSEC3 deployment risks are 
often greater than the usefulness provided by using NSEC3, unless there is an overriding 
need to deploy NSEC3 beyond zone content protection (examples include protecting 
personally indentifying information that may be contained in the DNS).  However, it is a 
good idea to use NSEC3-aware client software, because a client may access a zone that 
uses NSEC3 RRs with DNSSEC. 
As with other issues in DNSSEC involving secure hash algorithms, SHA-1 is the most 
widely used algorithm.  As of the time of writing, SHA-256 has yet to be widely 
implemented.  System installers and administrators should develop a transition plan to 
migrate from SHA-1 to SHA-256 when SHA-256 becomes available in major software 
distributions to prevent an attacker from performing a brute force attack against the 
hashed names and obtain the entire contents of a zone database. This would involve 
deploying both SHA-1 and SHA-256-based NSEC3 RRs until it is observed that SHA-
256-aware implementations have become widely used in the Internet community. 
 
8.2  Security/Compliance Issues 
1.  For digital signatures over DNS data, only SHA-1 (used with RSA or DSA) has both 
Federal government approval as a hash algorithm and is fully specified in DNSSEC 
(as of the time of writing).  It is the only approved hash algorithm available to use 
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software.   
2.  Although not strictly necessary to the specification, a Key Signing Key should be 
used to maintain security chains from the parent zone (e.g. .gov) to the zone (e.g. 
nist.gov).  This KSK should be securely transmitted to the delegating parent 
according to the policy and procedure established by the parent zone. 
3.  TSIG shared secret strings should be random for use in providing integrity protection 
for DNS message transactions, and generated at an appropriate security strength.  The 
system installers using the TSIG secret string shall agree on which TSIG algorithm to 
use.   
4.  System developers should implement SHA-256 (see FIPS 180-3) for use with digital 
signatures when the use of SHA-256 is specified through the IETF standards process.  
 
8.3  Procurement Guidance 
The following recommendations are for any individual that makes a purchasing decision 
for acquiring DNSSEC capable components for their network infrastructure. 
1.  DNSSEC utilities shall use FIPS140-2 compliant cryptographic modules.  
2.  DNS server software should generate and serve NSEC3 RRs, if required by zone 
policy. 
3.  DNS server software shall use an approved random bit generator to generate  random 
strings for use with TSIG message authentication using HMAC that is consistent with 
the hash algorithm security strength recommendations in Part 1. 
4.  DNSSEC-enabled versions of network applications shall be purchased as required by 
security policy, if available. 
5.  DNSSEC software implementing SHA-256 shall be included in procurements when 
available.  
8.4  Recommendations for System Installers 
The system installer is the individual(s) that installs a DNS component and performs the 
initial configuration of the component. 
 
8.4.1  Recommendations for System Installers (Authoritative Servers) 
1.  Authoritative server installers shall configure a DNS authoritiative server to serve 
DNSSEC signed zone data.   
 
2.  Authoritiative server installers shall use an approved random bit generator (as 
discussed in NIST Special Publication 800-90) to create and configure an initial 
random secret string for use with TSIG in transactions. 
 
  763. Authoritative  servers  shall be configured to generate and sign zone data with a key 
pair that is consistent with the key size recommendations for digital signatures as 
specified in Part 1. 
4. Authoritative  servers  shall be configured to generate and sign the key set with a key 
pair that is consistent with the key sizes recommended for digital signatures, as 
specified in Part 1.  
5. Authoritative  servers  shall be configured to generate and use a random secret string 
for zone transfer message authentication (via TSIG) between primary and secondary 
servers.  The security strength of the random bit generator process shall support the 
security strength required by the servers. 
6. Authoritative  servers  shall be configured to generate and use a separate shared secret 
string for dynamic update message authentication (via TSIG).  The security strength 
of the random bit generator process shall support the security strength required by the 
servers. 
 
8.4.2  Recommendations for System Installers (Caching Recursive Servers) 
1. Recursive  caching  server installers shall configure DNS servers to be DNSSEC-
aware. 
 
2. Recursive  caching  server installers shall install at least one public key used for 
DNSSEC validation. 
 
8.4.3  Recommendations for System Installers (Client Systems) 
1.  Client systems shall be configured to send DNS queries to a DNSSEC-enabled 
caching recursive server.  
2.  Client systems should be configured to use DNSSEC-enabled applications, if they are 
available. 
 
8.5  Recommendations for System Administrators  
The System Administrator is the individual who runs the DNS application on a day-to-
day basis and interacts with the end user.  
 
8.5.1  Recommendations for System Administrators (Authoritative Server) 
1.  Organization security policy regarding the Authoritative servers shall be enforced.  
2.  Cryptographic keys shall be protected as specified in Part 1. 
3.  System administrators shall replace zone data signature Resource Records before the 
end of their validity period. 
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with the public key is compromised, when the administrator of the DNS zone leaves 
the organization, and for other reasons listed in the organization’s security policy. 
5.  Administrators shall utilize methods for handling and protecting the private key (e.g., 
using a smart card that requires appropriate user authentication). 
Administrators shall follow the key lifecycle procedures found in NIST Special 
Publication 800-81 Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide. 
8.5.2  Recommendations for System Administrators (Caching Recursive Servers) 
1.  Server administrators shall ensure that there is an organization security policy for 
using the Caching Recursive Server. 
2.  Cryptographic keys shall be adequately protected (see Part 1). 
3.  The trust anchors for DNS validating caches should be kept up to date. 
 
8.5.3  Recommendations for System Administrators (Client Systems) 
1.  Server administrators shall ensure that there is an organization security policy for 
using the client systems. 
2.   Server administrators shall ensure that users are properly trained. 
 
8.6  Recommendations for End Users 
An end user is the individual using a client to access the system.  
 
1.  End users shall operate their client systems as instructed by their organization and 
system administrator. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  789   Encrypted File Systems (EFS)  
9.1  Description 
The encryption of data files and complete disk volumes presents a somewhat different set 
of key management issues than those for encryption of network-communicated data.  
While network communications security focuses on the privacy and integrity of 
information in transit, storage (e.g., file) security focuses on the privacy and integrity of 
persistent data and the secure sharing of this data.  The key management guidance 
surrounding file and volume encryption are sufficiently similar to consolidate into a 
single section. 
 
Unlike the previous sections where the protocols and/or standards have been thoroughly 
studied by the network security community, the commercial solutions for file encryption 
utilize a wide variety of security schemes and methods for storing keys.  Due to this 
range of solutions, this section will not be comprehensive, but will cover a variety of 
methods used for file encryption.   
 
The most important questions that designers of a file encryption system must answer are: 
•  How are keys used in the system, and what protection are they afforded? 
•  Where are the keys stored on the system? 
•  Does the method scale upward for numerous user communities (without requiring 
an impractical number of keys to be stored)? 
 
9.1.1  Number of Keys Required 
For an Encrypted File System, keys are used to encrypt a file or group of files.  The 
system can either encrypt each file with a distinct symmetric key or encrypt a set of files 
using the same symmetric key.  In the first case, it is very easy to provide access to a 
sharing user, for example, by simply giving the key to that user. In this way, only that 
single file can be accessed by the sharing user without providing access to any of the 
other files in the system.  The drawback with this first method is that if many files are 
encrypted, the model can quickly become unwieldy, since a key is required for each 
encrypted file and must be provided to the sharing user. 
 
In the second case, many fewer keys are required, which eases the key distribution 
process. However, when a sharing user requires access to a single file, giving access to 
that user is more problematic.  By simply sending a key to the sharing user, access would 
be provided to all of the owner’s
54 files that were encrypted using that key, rather than to 
the single file.  
 
However, there are several cryptographic management actions that could be used to grant 
access to an individual file.  One option to limit access in this second system is for the 
owner or system to decrypt the file and re-encrypt it using a new key for transmission to 
the sharing user (e.g., using network security mechanisms and session keys). In the 
                                                 
54 An owner could be an individual or a group of individuals or processes that share the key. 
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encrypted file would be placed in the sharing user’s file space.  This would require 
significant processing overhead and a key management protocol for exchanges between 
the owner and the sharing user or between the file system management process and the 
sharing user.  This process requires proper protection for these new keys, at the same 
security strength as the original key protecting that file. 
 
Another option is for the sharing user to be provided the encrypted file and the owner’s 
decryption key that could be used to decrypt all of the owner’s files, including the one 
provided to the sharing user.  System overhead is reduced, and it may be possible to 
protect the key from third party administrators, but it is unlikely that the owner would 
agree that the requester should be granted access to all files protected under the common 
key. 
 
Having provided more extreme examples in the previous two cases, the following is a 
more common approach that is used.  In this case, each user on the system has an 
asymmetric key pair.  Each owner’s file is encrypted under a different randomly 
generated symmetric File Encrypting Key (FEK).  The FEK is then encrypted using the 
public key of the owner and stored with the encrypted file.  When the owner of a file 
wants to share it with another user, the owner decrypts the encrypted FEK (using her 
private key) and then encrypts the FEK using the sharing user’s public key.  The 
encrypted file and re-encrypted FEK can then be provided to the requester.  This system 
has several advantages.  First, the owner needs to manage only a single asymmetric key 
pair.  Second, it permits easier file sharing between users. Third, it is very efficient 
because files do not have to be re-encrypted in order to be shared.  Finally, the system 
need not manage any keys separately, since the asymmetric keys are managed by the 
owners, and the FEKs are stored in encrypted form with the files. 
 
The owner can, of course, use different keys to encrypt different files or sets of files.  The 
fewer files that the owner chooses to encrypt with a given key results in more keys and 
associations (e.g., associations of keys with file identities, file groups, individual 
identities, or access groups) that would need to be maintained.   
 
Another important concept within an encrypted file system that must be considered is 
how data recovery is implemented.  If a user loses his keys, without a data recovery 
capability within the system, the user’s data is permanently lost.  As such, it is vital that 
some form of data recovery, such as master administrator passwords, be included.
55  This 
requires a file encryption system that allows multiple passwords to decrypt the file, one 
of which is provided to the user, and the second is provided to the administrator, in the 
form of a master administrator password.  Another possibility is that the administrator has 
a method of storing the user’s passwords for use only when the user has lost or forgotten 
their password. 
 
                                                 
55 The specifics of how data recovery is accomplished are beyond the scope of this document. 
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internet-work, the factors associated with the management of keys can become unwieldy.  
Key management challenges associated with large systems include the following: 
 
•  Maintaining context in the face of global data placement (many owners and large 
quantities of data). 
•  Very large numbers of keys to manage and distribute. 
•  If numerous keys are stored in a single location within an EFS, that site provides 
an attractive target for an adversary, a single point of trust for a large domain. 
•  Difficulty in accounting for revoked users (individuals who have left an 
organization, whose subscriptions have expired, or otherwise should not be 
authorized to access the file any longer). 
•  Reassignment of ownership of protected data to another individual or 
organization. 
•  Recovery of data in the event of lost keys (e.g., the case of archived encrypted 
data that is encrypted and stored by an individual who has left the organization 
and cannot be found). 
•  A sharing user who has been provided the keys to a number of the owner’s files, 
then provides the keys, and the owner’s data, to additional users. 
 
9.1.2  Access to Symmetric Keys used in File Encryption 
After the decision has been made about the number of files to be protected with a single 
symmetric key, key management questions can be considered. How does the File 
Encryption System generate the encryption keys?  How will the keys be stored and 
protected?  This section identifies common ways of answering these questions, as well as 
discussing their strengths and weaknesses. As technology advances, additional techniques 
will be developed, and as such, the list below is not complete nor should be considered 
mandatory. 
 
Consider common answers to the three important questions above.  First, how do file 
encryption systems generate symmetric keys?  A simple method is to derive the key from 
a password as described in [PKCS-5]. In this case, the security of the system depends on 
the randomness of the password; normally, passwords do not contain enough randomness 
to be used for generating keys (i.e., they can be guessed relatively easily).  A standard 
dictionary attack can often recover weak passwords, so a strong password is vital for the 
security of this type of system. It is preferable to utilize a good random bit generator 
within the system to generate keys. Approved random bit generation schemes can be 
found in NIST Special Publication 800-90.  Next, consider the question of how to protect 
the keys. There is a great deal of effort underway by the Trusted Computing Group 
(TCG) to develop secure storage of keys on computers.  As this effort continues to 
mature, the Trusted Platform Module chip, through its key cache management, offers 
another format for protecting keys used in EFS. 
 
Next, consider where these keys will be stored. If random keys need to be stored, they 
could simply be stored on the computer itself or on a hardware token.  Alternatively, the 
key could be split into two (or more) key components with, for example, one component 
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a split key is employed, the method used to combine the key components is important; 
performing an XOR operation on equal length key components is better than simply 
concatenating the components. Common hardware tokens include PCMCIA cards and 
smartcards.  The advantage to using a hardware token is that if the user stores the 
hardware token away from the computer, and the key is split between the token and the 
computer, an adversary needs to recover both pieces of hardware to recover the key.  
Additional security may be provided by encrypting the key splits, perhaps by using a 
password. 
 
There are many permutations of answers to the questions above.  Four examples of how 
these questions can be answered will be considered, along with the pros and cons of each 
system.  It is important to consider the specific environment in which the File Encryption 
System will be used, as that will usually point to a specific type of system that is 
preferable for that case. 
 
The first example that will be considered is a file encryption system that uses a single 
symmetric key to encrypt every file on the system.  This single key is generated using 
[PKCS-5] from a user’s password.  
 
The second example is a system that utilizes per-file encryption keys, which are stored on 
the hard disk, encrypted by a key encryption key.  The key encryption key (which is also 
used to decrypt each file encryption key) is securely stored on the hard drive (e.g., using 
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [TPM]). 
 
The third example is a system that utilizes per-file encryption keys that are split into two 
key components that will be XORed to recreate the key, with one key component stored 
on a hardware token and the other component derived from a password (e.g., using 
PKCS-5 to derive the key).  
 
The fourth example uses per-file encryption keys, which are encrypted under the file 
owner’s asymmetric private key as previously described.  This system is common in 
current file encryption packages, while the previous three are extreme to show more 
clearly the pros and cons of the systems. 
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Method  Pros  Cons 
Example 1: 
PKCS #5 
- Least expensive solution. 
- Utilizing a strong password 
can result in reasonable 
security. 
- Less secure because the 
security is dependent only on 
the strength of the password. 
Example 2: 
Key Encryption 
Key 
- Secure storage directly in the 
computer.  
- Secure from external      
software attack and physical 
threat. 
- Relatively new technology. 
- Keys are stored on the same   
computer as the file. 
Example 3: 
Hardware Token 
- Splits key.  
- Requires two hardware 
pieces to decrypt. 
- Highly secure if implemented 
correctly. 
- If the files or token are lost, 
the files will stay secure. 
- More expensive. 
- If the token is lost, the files 
cannot be decrypted. 
Example 4: 
Asymmetric user 
owned Key 
Encryption Key 
- No plaintext keys stored in 
the computer. 
- Efficient file sharing. 
- Highly secure if token is 
used. 
- Compromise of a user’s 
private key compromises 
only the user’s files. 
-Requires the user to manage 
their own RSA key pair. 
- Requires either a user 
password or a user token. 
 
9.2  Security and Compliance Issues 
1.  Any encrypted file system shall employ approved cryptography if it is to be used for 
the protection of Federal government information. 
2.  Keys derived from passwords shall use strong passwords to maximize the difficulty 
of an off-line exhaustion attack; see SP 800-118
 42. 
 
9.3  Recommendations for Procurement Officials 
The following recommendations are for any individual(s) that make a purchasing 
decision for acquiring an EFS component. 
 
1.  An encrypted file system shall include a data recovery capability (e.g., master 
administrator password) so that the data is not lost in the event that a user forgets his 
password or the user is unavailable.  Data recovery is vital in this type of system. 
  832.  Any EFS system that derives keys from passwords should have the capability of 
enforcing the use of strong passwords.  
3.  To increase the security of encrypted file systems, the system should use a hardware 
token for storage of the key or the TPM for storage of the keys.  
 
9.4  Recommendations for System Installers 
The system installer is the individual(s) that installs EFS components and performs the 
initial configuration of the components. 
 
1.  When an EFS system that utilizes passwords for security is installed, the installer 
shall require that strong passwords be enforced by the EFS. This maximizes the 
difficulty of an off-line exhaustion attack. 
2.  The system installer should ensure that the database of keys is protected by 
encryption to ensure the security of the system.  In addition, if the key is split by the 
EFS system, the key component stored on a hardware token should be protected. 
 
9.5  Recommendations for System Administrators 
The system administrator is the individual that manages the EFS on a day-to-day basis 
and interacts with the end user. 
 
1.  The system administrator shall ensure that the organization’s security policy is 
enforced. 
2.  Key recovery procedures shall be in place to ensure that users can recover their data 
if they lose their authentication information (password, token data, etc).  A method 
for data recovery personnel to authenticate these users should be in place prior to the 
recovery of the user’s keys or files. 
3.  If the EFS includes a master administrator password for use in data recovery by the 
system administrator, the system administrator shall utilize a strong password. 
4.  System administrators shall provide training and security guidance to the end users of 
the system that, at a minimum, focuses on passwords, data recovery procedures, and 
user configuration of their system to utilize the authentication features within the 
system. 
 
9.6  Recommendations for End Users 
An end user is the individual that uses the EFS to secure and share their information. 
 
1.  If user-selected passwords are used within the product, end users shall utilize strong 
passwords to maximize the difficulty of an off-line exhaustion attack. 
2.  End users shall follow guidance provided by the system administrator regarding the 
use of an Encrypted File System product. 
  843.  End users shall inform a system administrator if they have lost their hardware token 
or forgotten their password. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  85Appendix A:  Glossary 
 
The terms provided below are defined as they are used in this document. The same terms 
may be defined differently in other documents. 
 
Term  Definition 
Access control  Restricts access to resources only to privileged entities. 
Access Control 
Mechanism 
A method for restricting access to some resource. 
Approved FIPS-approved  and/or  NIST-recommended. An algorithm or 
technique that is either 1) specified in a FIPS or NIST 
Recommendation, or 2) adopted in a FIPS or NIST 
Recommendation or 3) specified in a list of NIST approved 
security functions.  
Archive  See Key management archive. 
Asymmetric key 
algorithm 
See Public key cryptographic algorithm. 
Authentication  A process that establishes the origin of information, or 
determines an entity’s identity. 
 
Authentication code  See Message Authentication Code. 
Authorization Access  privileges granted to an entity; conveys an “official” 
sanction to perform a given security function or activity. 
Availability  Timely, reliable access to information by authorized entities. 
Backup  A copy of information to facilitate recovery, if necessary. 
CBC-MAC  A mode of operation for block cipher algorithms. 
Certificate  See public key certificate. 
Certification 
authority 
The entity in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is 
responsible for issuing certificates, and exacting compliance to 
a PKI policy. 
Checksum  A method used to protect the integrity of data by detecting 
errors in that data. 
Ciphertext  Data in its encrypted form. 
Compromise  The unauthorized disclosure, modification, substitution or use 
of sensitive data (e.g., keying material and other security related 
information). 
Confidentiality  The property that sensitive information is not disclosed to 
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Contingency plan  A plan that is maintained for disaster response, backup 
operations, and post-disaster recovery to ensure the availability 
of critical resources and to facilitate the continuity of operations 
in an emergency situation. 
Cryptographic 
Boundary 
An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the 
physical bounds of a cryptographic module and contains all 
hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a 
cryptographic module. 
Cryptographic Hash 
Function 
See Hash function. 
Cryptographic key 
(key) 
A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm 
that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with 
knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, 
while an entity without knowledge of the key cannot. Examples 
include:  
1.  the transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data,  
2.  the transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data,  
3.  the computation of a digital signature from data,    
4.  the verification of a digital signature,  
5.  the computation of an authentication code from data,  
6.  the verification of an authentication code from data and a 
received authentication code,  
7.  the computation of a shared secret that is used to derive 
keying material.  
Cryptographic 
module 
The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware in which 
approved security functions are implemented; a cryptographic 
module is contained within a cryptographic boundary. 
Cryptoperiod  The time span during which a specific key is authorized for use 
or in which the keys for a given system or application may 
remain in effect. 
Data integrity  A property whereby data has not been altered in an 
unauthorized manner since it was created, transmitted or stored. 
In this Recommendation, the statement that a cryptographic 
algorithm "provides data integrity" means that the algorithm is 
used to detect unauthorized alterations. 
Decryption  The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a 
cryptographic algorithm and key. 
DES  The Data Encryption Standard that was specified in FIPS 46 
(now withdrawn). 
Digital signature  The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when 
properly implemented, provides the services of:  
  871.   origin authentication,  
2.   data integrity, and  
3.   signer non-repudiation. 
Distribution  See key distribution. 
Encryption  The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a 
cryptographic algorithm and key. 
Entity  An individual (person), organization, device or process. 
Hash algorithm  See Hash function. 
Hash function  A function that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a fixed 
length bit string. Approved hash functions satisfy the following 
properties:  
1.   (One-way) It is computationally infeasible to find any input 
that maps to any pre-specified output, and  
2.  (Collision free) It is computationally infeasible to find any 
two distinct inputs that map to the same output. 
Hash value  The result of applying a hash function to information. 
Hash-based message 
authentication code 
(HMAC) 
A message authentication code that uses an approved keyed-
hash function. 
Identifier  A bit string that is associated with a person, device or 
organization.  It may be an identifying name, or may be 
something more abstract (for example, a string consisting of an 
IP address and timestamp), depending on the application. 
Initialization vector 
(IV) 
A vector used in defining the starting point of a cryptographic 
process within a cryptographic algorithm. 
Integrity  The property that sensitive data has not been modified or 
deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner. In this 
Recommendation, the statement that a cryptographic algorithm 
"provides integrity" means that the algorithm is used to detect 
unauthorized modifications or deletions. 
Key  See cryptographic key. 
Key agreement  A key establishment scheme whose resultant keying material is 
a function of information contributed by two or more 
participants, so that no party can predetermine the value of the 
keying material. 
Key  Bundle  A set of keys used during one operation, typically a TDEA 
operation. 
Key component  A parameter used in conjunction with other key components in 
an approved security function to form a plaintext cryptographic 
key or perform a cryptographic function.  
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that either owns or generates the key to another entity that is 
intended to use the key. 
Key encrypting key  A cryptographic key that is used for the encryption or 
decryption of other keys. 
Key establishment  A function in the lifecycle of keying material; the process by 
which cryptographic keys are securely distributed among 
cryptographic modules using manual transport methods (e.g., 
key loaders), automated methods (e.g., key transport and/or key 
agreement protocols), or a combination of automated and 
manual methods. 
Key management  The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and 
other related security parameters (e.g., IVs and passwords) 
during the entire life cycle of the keys, including their 
generation, storage, establishment, entry and output, and 
destruction. 
Key management 
archive 
A function in the lifecycle of keying material; a repository 
containing keying material of historical interest. 
Key pair  A public key and its corresponding private key; a key pair is 
used with a public key algorithm. 
Key recovery  Mechanisms and processes that allow authorized entities to 
retrieve keying material from key backup or archive. 
Key revocation  A process whereby a notice is made available to affected 
entities that keying material should be removed from 
operational use prior to the end of the established cryptoperiod 
of that keying material.  
Key transport  A key establishment procedure whereby one entity (the sender) 
selects a value for secret keying material and then securely 
distributes that value to another party (the receiver). 
Key update  A function performed on a cryptographic key in order to 
compute a new, but related, key. 
Key wrapping  A method of encrypting keys (along with associated integrity 
information) that provides both confidentiality and integrity 
protection using a symmetric key. 
Keying material  The data (e.g., keys and IVs) necessary to establish and 
maintain cryptographic keying relationships. 
Message 
Authentication Code 
(MAC) 
A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key to 
detect both accidental and intentional modifications of data. 
Nonce  A time-varying value that has, at most, a negligible chance of 
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generated anew for each instance of a nonce, a timestamp, a 
sequence number, or some combination of these. 
Non-repudiation A  service  that is used to provide assurance of the integrity and 
origin of data in such a way that the integrity and origin can be 
verified by a third party as having originated from a specific 
entity in possession of the private key of the claimed signatory. 
Owner  For an asymmetric key pair, the entity that owns the private 
key, whether that entity generated the key pair or a trusted party 
generated the key pair for the entity.  
 
In Encrypted File Systems, the file owner has control over the 
file and grants access of the file to others.  A file may have one 
or more owners.  An owner could be an individual or a group of 
individuals or processes 
Password  A string of characters (letters, numbers and other symbols) that 
are used to authenticate an identity or to verify access 
authorization. 
Payload  A part of the data stream representing the user information and 
user overhead in a communication. 
Plaintext  Intelligible data that has meaning and can be understood 
without the application of decryption. 
Private key  A cryptographic key, used with a public key cryptographic 
algorithm, that is uniquely associated with an entity and is not 
made public. In an asymmetric (public) cryptosystem, the 
private key is associated with a public key. Depending on the 
algorithm, the private key may be used to:  
1.  Compute the corresponding public key,  
2.  Compute a digital signature that may be verified by the 
corresponding public key,  
3.  Decrypt data that was encrypted by the corresponding public 
key, or  
4.  Compute a piece of common shared data, together with other 
information. 
Protocol  A special set of rules used by two or more entities that describe 
the message order and data structures for information 
exchanged between the entities. 
Public key  A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic 
algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and that 
may be made public. In an asymmetric (public) cryptosystem, 
the public key is associated with a private key. The public key 
may be known by anyone and, depending on the algorithm, may 
be used to: 
  901. Verify a digital signature that is signed by the corresponding 
private key, 
2. Encrypt data that can be decrypted by the corresponding 
private key, or 
3. Compute a piece of shared data. 
Public key 
(asymmetric) 
cryptographic 
algorithm 
 A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys, a public 
key and a private key. The two keys have the property that 
determining the private key from the public key is 
computationally infeasible. 
Public key certificate  A set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains the 
entity's public key and possibly other information, and is 
digitally signed by a trusted party, thereby binding the public 
key to the entity.  
Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) 
A framework that is established to issue, maintain and revoke 
public key certificates. 
Reconstitute  Rebuilding a service provider (possibly with a different 
infrastructure) using previously saved security information 
and/or key material, rather than simply restarting a service from 
a backup. 
Rekey  A new key replaces another key; the “value” of the new key is 
entirely independent of the “value” of the old key. 
Relying party  An individual or organization that relies on the certificate and 
the CA that issued the certificate to verify the identity of the 
user; the validity of the public key, associated algorithms and 
any relevant parameters; and the user’s possession of the 
corresponding private key. 
Secret key  A cryptographic key that is used with a secret key (symmetric) 
cryptographic algorithm that is uniquely associated with one or 
more entities and is not made public. The use of the term 
“secret” in this context does not imply a classification level, but 
rather implies the need to protect the key from disclosure. 
Security association  A relationship between two network entities in which security 
information is shared and used to support secure 
communication between the two entities. 
Security services  Mechanisms used to provide confidentiality, data integrity, 
authentication or non-repudiation of information. 
Self-signed 
certificate 
A public key certificate whose digital signature may be verified 
by the public key contained within the certificate.  The 
signature on a self-signed certificate protects the integrity of the 
data, but does not guarantee authenticity of the information. 
The trust of self-signed certificates is based on the secure 
procedures used to distribute them. 
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Information Processing Standard (FIPS) or a requirement that 
must be fulfilled to claim conformance to this 
Recommendation. Note that shall may be coupled with not to 
become shall not. 
Shared secret  A value that is generated during a key agreement scheme; the 
shared secret is typically used to derive keying material for a 
symmetric key algorithm. 
Should  This term is used to indicate a very important requirement. 
While the “requirement” is not stated in a FIPS, ignoring the 
requirement could result in undesirable results. Note that 
should may be coupled with not to become should not. 
Signature verification  Uses a digital signature algorithm and a public key to verify a 
digital signature. 
Symmetric key  A single cryptographic key that is used with a secret 
(symmetric) key algorithm. 
Symmetric key 
algorithm 
A cryptographic algorithm that uses one shared key, a secret 
key. 
Threat  Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely 
impact a system through unauthorized access, destruction, 
disclosure, modification of data or denial of service. 
Triple DES/Triple 
DEA (TDEA) 
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm, specified in SP 800-67. 
3-TDEA  Three key TDEA as specified in SP 800-67. 
 
Unauthorized 
disclosure 
An event involving the exposure of information to entities not 
authorized access to the information. 
User name (in a 
certificate) 
The name of the party authorized to use the private key 
associated with the public key in the certificate; the subject of 
the certificate. 
User registration  A function in the lifecycle of keying material; a process 
whereby an entity becomes a member of a security domain. 
X.509 public key 
certificate 
 The public key for a user (or device) and a name for the user 
(or device), together with some other information, rendered un-
forgeable by the digital signature of the certification authority 
that issued the certificate, encoded in the format defined in the 
ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard. 
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Appendix B:  Acronyms 
 
AES  Advanced Encryption Standard 
AH Authentication  Header 
AS Authentication  Server 
CA Certificate  Authority 
CBC  Cipher Block Chaining 
CBC-MAC  Cipher Block Chaining Message 
Authentication Code 
CMVP  Cryptographic Module Validation 
Program 
COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
CRL  Certificate Revocation List 
CTR Counter  Mode 
DES  Data Encryption Standard 
DHCP  Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
DNS Domain  Name  System 
DSA  Digital Signature Algorithm 
ECDH  Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
ECDSA  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm 
EFS  Encrypted File System 
ESP Encapsulating  Security  Protocol 
FEK  File Encryption Key 
GCM  Galois Counter Mode 
GMAC  Galois Message Authentication Code 
HMAC Hash-based  Message  Authentication 
Code 
HTTP  Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
ICV  Integrity Check Value 
IETF  Internet Engineering Task Force 
IKE  Internet Key Exchange 
IP Internet  Protocol 
IV Initialization  Vector 
KDC  Key Distribution Center 
KMF  Key Management Facility 
KMM  Key Management Message 
KSK  Key Signing Key 
KWK Key  Wrapping  Key 
LDAP Lightweight  Directory Access Protocol 
MAC Message  Authentication  Code 
  93MD5  Message-Digest Algorithm 5 
NSEC Next  Secure 
NIST  National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 
OCSP  Online Certificate Status Protocol 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OTAR  Over The Air Rekeying 
PIN Personal  Identification  Number 
PKCS  Public Key Cryptography Standard  
PKI  Public Key Infrastructure 
PRF Pseudorandom  Function 
PVM  Path Validation Module 
RA Registration  Authority 
RFC  Request for Comment 
RR Resource  Record 
RSA  Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman. 
SA Security  Association 
SEP  Secure Entry Point 
SHA  Secure Hash Algorithm 
SMTP  Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
S/MIME  Secure/Multipart Internet Mail 
Extensions 
SSL  Secure Socket Layer 
TDEA  Triple Data Encryption Algorithm 
TEK  Traffic Encryption Key 
TCG  Trusted Computing Group 
TGS  Ticket Granting Service 
TLS  Transport Layer Security 
TPM  Trusted Platform Module 
TS Target  Server 
TSIG Transaction  Signature 
URL  Uniform Resource Locator 
VPN  Virtual Private Network 
XOR Exclusive-Or  operation 
ZSK  Zone Signing Key 
 
 
  94Appendix C:  A Word to Novice End Users 
 
Cryptographic keys are frequently categorized by the algorithms they are used with, the 
operations they are used to perform and by the number of times they can be used.  Keys 
will either be asymmetric and used with an asymmetric algorithm, or symmetric and used 
with a symmetric algorithm.  Asymmetric keys are generated as key pairs: a private key 
that must be kept secret, and a related public key, that may not be a secret.  In general, the 
private key performs one operation, for example, a digital signature, and the public key 
does the complementary operation, in this case, signature verification.  In the case of 
symmetric keys, end users need to treat the key as a shared secret value and use the same 
value for complementary cryptographic functions, such as encryption and decryption. 
 
Some asymmetric keys are static and intended for long-term use, while others are 
ephemeral and expire after use with one message or session.  The public key of a static 
asymmetric key pair is often provided in a public key certificate, while an ephemeral 
public key is not. Although the concept of static vs. ephemeral also applies to symmetric 
keys, a short term symmetric key is often called a session key, rather than an ephemeral 
key. No specific terminology is used for a long-term symmetric key. An application or 
protocol may be supported by some combination of such keys. 
 
A PKI is the foundation of many current key management processes and is used in many 
of the protocols or applications described in this Recommendation, as well as other 
security protocols and applications.  Some understanding of the role of a PKI and public 
key certificates in key management is very helpful to setting up security protocols or 
applications properly.  A long-term, or “static” public key is generally combined with the 
name of the key’s “owner” in an electronic document called a public key certificate.  
While certificates can be self-issued and signed (that is, the party that created the key pair 
can sign his name and the public key with the corresponding private key), most 
certificates are digitally signed with the private key of a trusted entity called a 
Certification Authority.   
 
An end user may typically have one or more certificates, and may have different 
certificates for different applications, e.g., for e-mail and for authentication to web sites.  
As Federal Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards are issued to Federal employees 
and contractors, most Federal users will have a personal smart card that contains one or 
more personal certificates issued to them by their agency.  Other specific applications 
may require “soft” certificates, usually kept on the user’s computer, and possibly issued 
by commercial CAs.  For example, browser products, such as Internet Explorer, Firefox 
or Safari, typically implement a mechanism to generate key pairs, send the public keys to 
a CA and return a public key certificate for that key to the browser.  The certificates are 
then kept in a user certificate store on the user’s computer, which can be managed in a 
manner similar to a root certificate store (see Section 2).  The process and interfaces for 
generating keys, and for requesting, downloading and installing certificates are specific to 
both the individual user client product and, sometimes, to the CA itself; however, the 
websites of CAs often have pages that “walk” the user through the key generation and 
certificate issuance process for the common browser products.  Users can share 
certificates via email or public key infrastructures, smart cards or other memory tokens. 
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Similarly, secure web servers have TLS/SSL server certificates, with certain specific 
characteristics; note that, although Federal users are required to use TLS rather than SSL, 
SSL is really just an earlier version of TLS, and the certificates are identical). The Subject 
Name in these certificates follows specific rules so that the domain name of the server is 
included in the Subject Name field of the certificate.  Commercial CAs sell SSL 
certificates, and, where it is important to reach a general population of non-government 
users, it may be desirable to get an SSL certificate from a CA that has its root certificate 
widely distributed “out of the box” in the certificate stores of Microsoft Windows, 
Macintosh OS X, and the various Mozilla browsers.  This will allow most users to verify 
the server certificate.  However, it is important to review the certificate policy and 
choices that may be available from the CAs selling SSL certificates for use on Federal 
agency web servers in order to ensure that the certificates meet the requirements stated 
herein and in SP 800-57, part 1. 
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